Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to xetenet/xete-mcp. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/xetenet/xete-mcp/main/.claude/skills/solana-security-hardening/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/xetenet/xete-mcpWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/xetenet/xete-mcp/solana-security-hardening)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/xetenet/xete-mcp/solana-security-hardening"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/xetenet/xete-mcp/solana-security-hardening/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/xetenet/xete-mcp/solana-security-hardening"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/xetenet/xete-mcp/solana-security-hardening.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00111 | $0.01281 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00056 | $0.00641 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00022 | $0.00256 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00128 |
Grade A, and why
solana-security-hardening scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 62 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Solana Security Hardening
Run this checklist against every diff in scope. Each item is a gate: pass, or document why it does not apply. "Probably fine" fails the gate. Items tagged (BM-…) were added because this codebase shipped that exact bug once — the benchmark file holds the doubt prompt.
On-chain (xete-tab / Xete Swap)
Account validation
- Every account's owner is checked against the expected program
- Every signer requirement is enforced (
is_signer), including on close/settle paths - PDA derivations re-verified in the program, never trusted from client-supplied bump/address
- Account discriminators / type checks prevent substituting one account type for another
- Writable accounts justified — no account writable that doesn't need to be
- CPI account-list completeness across asset variants: for every external-program CPI, the callee's optional/conditional accounts are enumerated and each input variant (standalone vs collection-member, Token vs Token-2022, …) is either supported or explicitly rejected, with a test per variant (BM-swap-core-cpi-collection)
Arithmetic
- All token/lamport math uses checked ops (
checked_add,checked_sub,checked_mul) or saturating with explicit rationale -
overflow-checks = truein release profile confirmed in Cargo.toml - Rounding direction on any division is explicit and favors the protocol/counterparty as intended
State & flow
- Commitment scheme preimages include all fields that must not be malleable (SHA256 inputs enumerated in a comment)
- No instruction can be replayed to double-settle a tab; replay protection identified by name
- Close/settle paths zero or reassign lamports correctly (no resurrection attacks)
- Any state referenced by address is re-validated against the agreed terms at settle time — a closed PDA can be recreated at the same address with different contents; takers/acceptors supply expected-terms (slippage) bounds (BM-swap-pda-reopen-rug)
- Degenerate economics rejected at creation time: zero amounts, born-expired timestamps (BM-swap-zero-amount-listings)
- Every value transfer moves a priced/consented amount the caller agreed to — never a balance read (BM-relay-payment-drainer)
- CPI targets validated by program ID, not by account position
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 62 lines · 111 tokens per session scan A b73113b57381
solana-security-hardening is a skill published in the GitHub repository xetenet/xete-mcp (0 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 111 tokens to every session and 1,281 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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