Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Youngmaidainon/Agent-Level-Up --skill correlating-threat-campaignsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Youngmaidainon/Agent-Level-UpWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/youngmaidainon/agent-level-up/correlating-threat-campaigns)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/youngmaidainon/agent-level-up/correlating-threat-campaigns"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/youngmaidainon/agent-level-up/correlating-threat-campaigns/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/youngmaidainon/agent-level-up/correlating-threat-campaigns"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/youngmaidainon/agent-level-up/correlating-threat-campaigns.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00099 | $0.01566 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00049 | $0.00783 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00020 | $0.00313 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00157 |
Grade A, and why
correlating-threat-campaigns scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
100% identical to correlating-threat-campaigns — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 169 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Correlating Threat Campaigns
When to Use
Use this skill when:
- Multiple unrelated-appearing incidents share IOCs (same C2 IP, same malware hash, similar TTPs)
- An ISAC partner shares indicators from an incident that match your own historical events
- Building a campaign report linking adversary activity over weeks or months to a single operation
Do not use this skill to force correlation based on weak signals — false campaign attribution misleads defenders and wastes resources on incorrect threat models.
Prerequisites
- TIP or SIEM with historical indicator and event data (90+ days recommended)
- MISP correlation engine enabled with event sharing configured
- Graph analysis tool (Maltego, Neo4j, or OpenCTI) for relationship visualization
- Reference to MITRE ATT&CK intrusion set and campaign objects for structuring output
Workflow
Step 1: Collect and Normalize Events
Gather all candidate events for correlation from:
- Internal SIEM (raw events, alert history)
- TIP (historical indicators and events)
- ISAC sharing (partner-submitted events in MISP or TAXII)
- Commercial intelligence (Recorded Future, Mandiant, CrowdStrike reports)
Normalize all events to STIX 2.1 schema with consistent timestamp (UTC), indicator types, and confidence scores. Ensure all indicators have source attribution and collection date.
Step 2: Identify Correlation Pivot Points
Apply systematic pivot analysis across four dimensions:
Infrastructure pivots:
- Same IP address or /24 subnet across events
- Same domain registrant email or WHOIS organization
- Same ASN or hosting provider with same account fingerprint
- Same SSL certificate fingerprint or serial number across C2 domains
Capability pivots:
- Same malware hash or YARA signature match
- Same C2 communication protocol (Cobalt Strike beacon config, Sliver implant parameters)
- Same exploit code or weaponized document template
- Same obfuscation method or packer fingerprint
Temporal pivots:
- Events occurring within same time window (operational hours suggesting same timezone)
- Sequential events with logical kill chain progression
- Malware compilation timestamps clustering in same date range
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 169 lines · 99 tokens per session scan A 7d7a0ec11e9a
correlating-threat-campaigns is a skill published in the GitHub repository Youngmaidainon/Agent-Level-Up (3 stars, last pushed 18d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 99 tokens to every session and 1,566 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 100% identical to correlating-threat-campaigns, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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correlating-threat-campaigns
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