cloudflare

• The catalog is Cloudflare's own search and execute. search runs code against Cloudflare's OpenAPI document; execute runs code that may call any Cloudflare API endpoint the OAuth grant allows.
• Connecta classifies execute as a write, even for a program that only reads, because one program can mix GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, and DELETE and no schema proves otherwise. A read-only endpoint therefore gets only search here. Deployments that need API reads from a read-only endpoint configure an API-token connector, whose cloudflare_api_read and named reads are reads.
• Use search to find the exact method, path, and fields before writing an execute program. Do not guess an endpoint from product naming.
• Keep returned values small. Filter and project inside the Cloudflare program, then reduce again inside Connecta's execute_code when several calls must be joined.
• This connection has none of the REST connector's tools: no cloudflare_api_* validation against a pinned index, no graphql_query, no cloudflare_api_upload, and no account or zone pin. OAuth permissions are the boundary.

• An auth_required failure means this connector's Cloudflare authorization is missing or expired: run authorize_connector for this connector id, then retry the same call unchanged.

This connector holds a Global API Key. It acts as its Cloudflare user with every permission that user has, in every account and zone the user belongs to, and nothing on Cloudflare's side narrows it. A mistaken write can reach production domains, billing, and members across all of them. Prefer reads, state the account and zone of every write, and stop when a request is ambiguous. Writes under /user and /memberships are refused. R2 accepts API tokens only, so R2 operations fail with this key.

• This is Connecta's REST connector to the Cloudflare v4 API, holding one operator-managed credential. cloudflare_api_search finds API operations in a pinned index (not records) and names the tool that calls each; cloudflare_api_details returns one operation's parameters and body with types, enums, and required names. Neither sends a request.
• cloudflare_api_read calls GET operations plus reviewed read-only POSTs: analytics queries, Analytics Engine and SQL API queries, Log Explorer SQL, Vectorize queries, KV bulk get, telemetry queries, and validation checks. cloudflare_api_write calls every other POST, PUT, PATCH, and DELETE with method and path stated. D1 …/query and …/raw, Durable Object queries, Workers AI …/ai/run, AI Search and AutoRAG search (query rewriting runs billed models), monetization checks, and flag evaluation are writes: they can change data, cost money, or activate something.
• Paths are concrete: substitute ids into the template search returned (/zones/<zone id>/dns_records/<record id>). Pass query and body as JSON named as details lists them; text operations (Analytics Engine SQL, Log Explorer SQL, Worker scripts) take a string body, and Vectorize inserts a list of objects sent as NDJSON. R2 calls accept headers with cf-r2-jurisdiction or cf-r2-storage-class. Encode a / inside an R2 object key or KV key name as %2F.
• Every call is checked against the pinned index before it is sent. An unknown path returns the nearest operations; an unknown or missing parameter returns validation.issues with the accepted names. Nothing reached Cloudflare, so fix the call from that answer.
• Results arrive as { status, data, page? } with Cloudflare's envelope unwrapped: data is the result. On a list, pass page.next as the page.param query argument (page for numbered lists, cursor for KV, R2, and other cursor lists). Lists belong inside execute_code; pass select (dot paths such as id and name) to keep only the fields the question needs.
• list_zones and list_accounts resolve names to ids; verify_credential separates a bad credential from a missing permission. graphql_query runs read-only GraphQL Analytics queries (mutations are refused before sending); filter every zones or accounts field by zoneTag or accountTag. A pinned connector sends one query per document, with every fragment it defines used.
• Multipart, binary, and file bodies go through cloudflare_api_upload: Worker scripts and versions, KV values, R2 objects, Pages deployments, Images, Stream, DNS zone-file import, and Snippets. It takes textBody, base64Body, or multipart parts, never a local file.
• Refused by design: every operation that mints, rotates, or hands back a credential (API tokens, Access service tokens, R2 temporary credentials, tunnel and Mesh node tokens, signing keys, registry credentials, direct-upload URLs, deploy hooks, preview and participant tokens), payment client secrets, URL Scanner captures (results, HAR, DOM, raw responses: they hold the scanned session's cookies and headers; use the scan search for verdicts), and GETs that act (an email unsubscribe, a PagerDuty connect). Stored and embedded secrets (Turnstile, TSIG, webhook and identity-provider secrets, Stream keys, Logpush destination credentials, probe and custom-provider headers, BGP keys, Zaraz variables, Hyperdrive database passwords, RealtimeKit storage credentials, transform-rule header values) and every environment or plain-text binding value (Pages, Containers, Workers, Builds; names and types stay) come back as "[redacted]" on every method. Notification, RealtimeKit, and data security webhook destinations keep only their scheme and host. Workers KV values are application data and come back as stored. Reviewed operations, and operations that take credentials, report Cloudflare's error codes without its error text. Worker script content is readable: it is code, and secret bindings are not part of it.
• An auth_required failure means the credential is missing, revoked, or malformed: an operator must replace it in this connection in the operator UI, and authorize_connector returns that handoff. provider_permission_denied means the credential works but lacks this permission or resource, or the call is outside the pin; ask rather than retry.