Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/zealynxsecurity/krait/fuzzernpx skills add ZealynxSecurity/krait --skill fuzzergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ZealynxSecurity/kraitWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/zealynxsecurity/krait/fuzzer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/zealynxsecurity/krait/fuzzer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/zealynxsecurity/krait/fuzzer.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00000 | $0.01554 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00777 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00311 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00155 |
Grade A, and why
fuzzer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 222 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Krait Fuzzer — Invariant Extraction & Testing Methodology
This skill defines how to extract invariants from smart contracts and generate Foundry fuzz tests to verify them.
Core Principle
The LLM does NOT audit for vulnerabilities. It:
- Understands the code deeply
- Documents all invariants (properties that must always hold)
- Generates Foundry tests to verify those invariants
- Iterates on test failures to distinguish test bugs from real violations
Invariant Categories
| Category | Description | Example |
|---|---|---|
| accounting | Balance/supply consistency | totalSupply == sum(balances[i]) |
| access-control | Permission boundaries | onlyOwner can call pause() |
| state-transition | Valid state machine flows | state can only go ACTIVE → PAUSED → ACTIVE |
| economic | Price/rate/value bounds | exchangeRate >= 1e18 (never decreases) |
| token-conservation | No token creation/destruction | tokensBefore + deposited == tokensAfter |
| ordering | Temporal constraints | withdrawTime > depositTime |
| bounds | Value range constraints | fee <= MAX_FEE |
| relationship | Multi-variable relationships | debt <= collateral * ltv / 1e18 |
Invariant Extraction Methodology
Step 1: State Variable Analysis
For each contract:
- List ALL storage variables
- Group related variables (e.g.,
totalSupplyandbalancesmapping) - Identify computed relationships: does variable A depend on variable B?
- Check constructor/initializer: what invariants are established at deployment?
Step 2: Require/Assert Mining
Every require() and assert() is a developer-stated invariant:
require(balances[msg.sender] >= amount, "insufficient"); // INV: balance >= withdrawal
assert(totalSupply == _computeTotal()); // INV: supply consistency
Also check modifiers — onlyOwner, whenNotPaused, nonReentrant all encode invariants.
Step 3: Function-Level Invariants
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 222 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 95c3685662c3
fuzzer is a skill published in the GitHub repository ZealynxSecurity/krait (22 stars, last pushed 23d ago), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 1,554 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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