Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add zero-lab-ai/skills --skill credential-exposure-auditgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/zero-lab-ai/skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/zero-lab-ai/skills/credential-exposure-audit)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/zero-lab-ai/skills/credential-exposure-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/zero-lab-ai/skills/credential-exposure-audit/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/zero-lab-ai/skills/credential-exposure-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/zero-lab-ai/skills/credential-exposure-audit.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00067 | $0.01392 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00027 | $0.00557 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00013 | $0.00278 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00139 |
Grade A, and why
credential-exposure-audit scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 117 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Credential exposure audit
A credential-shaped string, record, file, or log entry does not by itself prove usable material. Keep material presence separate from current validity, identity, privilege, and reachable systems. Preserve raw values in restricted evidence; the audit contains redacted references only.
This skill reviews supplied evidence and protection controls. It does not collect new credential material, decrypt stores, inspect unsupplied memory, crack hashes, authenticate, replay tokens, test destinations, or plan lateral movement.
When to Use
- Audit credential exposure for authorized security work.
- Use only within explicit authorization and the stated rules of engagement.
When NOT to Use
- Do not treat this skill as permission to access, test, or change a target.
- Do not convert missing evidence into a clean result or a stronger claim.
Workflow
- Record authorization, exact assets, business context, the supplied-evidence
boundary, restricted evidence location, retention, and disposition owner. Use
unknownor null when a handling fact was not supplied; do not invent a vault path, owner, retention period, or asset purpose. - Inventory each evidence item with its asset, locator, class, access state,
protection, integrity hash for copied artifacts, and exact time or honest
bounded collection window. Never invent acquisition precision or a digest. If
content is described but no copied artifact and hash were supplied, use the
matching metadata or configuration evidence kind and state the integrity gap.
Never use repeated hexadecimal characters as a stand-in digest.
Do not assign evidence to a host because its content names that host or a URL.
When the source asset is not supplied, use an
otherasset namedUnattributed supplied evidenceand record the provenance gap. - Keep raw secrets out of the audit. Use a restricted redacted reference and a disposition record for every observed or redacted secret-bearing item.
- Classify what the evidence establishes: indicator, credential reference, protected material, redacted material, direct observation, potential container, or expected credential mechanism.
- Record exposure separately: protected, owner-accessible, broadly accessible, historical broad access, unknown, or not an exposure. A variable name, masked value, or uninspected dump is not confirmed material exposure.
- Record freshness, longevity, identity binding, privilege, and reachability as separate facts. Mark them verified only from administrative, runtime, or configuration evidence; never infer them from a filename, account label, or credential format.
- Bind each protection control to evidence and state its limitation. Encryption, file permissions, masking, short lifetime, process protection, and storage ACLs reduce different risks and cannot clear unrelated surfaces.
- Cover memory, local stores, browser and vault data, private keys, cloud caches, application configuration, histories and logs, process environments, workload identity, retained artifacts, authorization, and handling. Blocked work stays visible and receives a reason.
- Link every medium-or-higher observation to an owned action and verification method. Administrative inventory can close identity, validity, privilege, and last-use gaps without authenticating with the credential.
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- yesterday First seen · 117 lines · 67 tokens per session scan A 8b8d3d4ed176
credential-exposure-audit is a skill published in the GitHub repository zero-lab-ai/skills (283 stars, last pushed 12d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 67 tokens to every session and 1,392 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-10-26.
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