Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Zyrexnn/Cybermes --skill cloud-iam-deepgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Zyrexnn/CybermesWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/zyrexnn/cybermes/cloud-iam-deep)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/zyrexnn/cybermes/cloud-iam-deep"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/zyrexnn/cybermes/cloud-iam-deep/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/zyrexnn/cybermes/cloud-iam-deep"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/zyrexnn/cybermes/cloud-iam-deep.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00238 | $0.06774 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00095 | $0.02710 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00048 | $0.01355 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00024 | $0.00677 |
Grade B, and why
cloud-iam-deep scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Cloud metadata endpointmediumServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ This is a copy
100% identical to cloud-iam-deep — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 522 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
When to use
Trigger when:
- A cloud credential surfaces (key, secret, token, JSON file)
- SSRF chain reaches IMDS / metadata endpoint
- APK / git-leak reveals embedded cloud key
- Recon shows public S3/GCS/Azure-blob with permissions you can verify
- A Kubernetes API or service-account token is exposed
- Post-RCE on a cloud-hosted instance — pivot to cloud control plane
Do NOT use for:
- On-prem-only environments (use AD attack skills — but those are out of scope per external-only boundary)
- Web2 vulns that happen to be on AWS — use the relevant
hunt-*skill
Credential identification (first 60 seconds)
# AWS access key patterns
AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16} # IAM user access key (long-term)
ASIA[0-9A-Z]{16} # STS temporary credential
AGPA[0-9A-Z]{16} # IAM group
AIDA[0-9A-Z]{16} # IAM user (user-id)
AROA[0-9A-Z]{16} # IAM role
ANPA[0-9A-Z]{16} # Managed policy
# AWS secret pattern (40-char base64-ish — context required)
[A-Za-z0-9/+=]{40} # AWS secret access key
# Azure
AccountKey=[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{86} # Storage account key
client_secret pattern + UUID # Azure AD app credential
# GCP service account JSON
{
"type": "service_account",
"project_id": "...",
"private_key_id": "...",
"private_key": "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----..."
}
# K8s SA token (JWT format — decode to confirm)
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1... # decode kid claim to see issuer
AWS — read-only validation (the safe first step)
# Set credential
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="AKIA..."
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="..."
# 1. WHO am I?
aws sts get-caller-identity
# Returns: UserId, Account, Arn
# Arn tells you: IAM user vs role, account ID, name
# 2. WHAT can I do? (the privesc question)
# Try common read-only first — failures still inform you
aws iam list-users 2>&1 | head -5
aws iam list-roles 2>&1 | head -5
aws iam list-policies 2>&1 | head -5
aws iam list-groups 2>&1 | head -5
# 3. WHAT policies are attached to me?
aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name <self>
aws iam list-user-policies --user-name <self> # inline policies
aws iam list-groups-for-user --user-name <self>
# 4. Service-by-service surface
aws ec2 describe-instances --max-items 1 2>&1 | head
aws s3 ls 2>&1 | head -10
aws lambda list-functions --max-items 5 2>&1 | head
aws rds describe-db-instances --max-items 5 2>&1 | head
aws secretsmanager list-secrets --max-results 5 2>&1 | head
aws ssm describe-parameters --max-results 5 2>&1 | head
# 5. Audit any cross-account / external trust
aws iam list-roles --query 'Roles[?contains(AssumeRolePolicyDocument.Statement[0].Principal.AWS, `arn:aws:iam::`)]' 2>&1 | head -20
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 522 lines · 238 tokens per session scan B d495d06f4039
cloud-iam-deep is a skill published in the GitHub repository Zyrexnn/Cybermes (668 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 238 tokens to every session and 6,774 once invoked, about $0.0010 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (cloud metadata endpoint, makes network calls). It is 100% identical to cloud-iam-deep, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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