William2333ZZ

William2333ZZ/trustshell

Plugin Claude Code

Plugin marketplace listing 1 plugin: trustshell.

William2333ZZ/trustshell

Plugin Claude Code

AI agent security for Claude Code — read the code, break the running agent, prove it (exploit-validated). Commands: /static-scan, /red-team. Subagent: agent-red-teamer. Skills: RT-1..RT-9.

William2333ZZ/trustshell

Agent

Use this to security-test an AI AGENT (not ordinary app code) — prompt injection, memory poisoning, tool/action abuse, sandbox escape, channel injection, supply chain, exfiltration. It runs TrustShell's static-triage → dynamic-confirm loop and reports only exploit-validated findings. Authorized, disposable-environment…

William2333ZZ/trustshell

Command

Red-team a RUNNING AI agent you own/are authorized to test; a finding is CONFIRMED only when the exploit's proof marker returns. Authorized, disposable-env testing only.

William2333ZZ/trustshell

Command

Statically triage an AI agent's SOURCE for candidate vulnerable paths (RT-1..RT-9). Candidate != vuln — confirm with /red-team.

William2333ZZ/trustshell

Skill Claude CodeCodex

Security-audit an AI agent's OWN framework code for classic appsec vulnerabilities the LLM can't defend — path traversal, command injection, SSRF, fail-open security controls, missing/late auth, unsafe deserialization — especially at the untrusted-input boundaries (channels, file/media handlers, config & skill…

William2333ZZ/trustshell

Skill Claude CodeCodex

Orchestrate a static + dynamic, exploit-validated red-team of an AI agent — read the source to find candidate vulnerable paths, then run the dynamic skills to confirm or refute each one empirically. The arbiter of truth is whether the exploit works, not a model vote. Authorized testing of agents you own or are…

William2333ZZ/trustshell

Skill Claude CodeCodex

The end-to-end methodology for red-teaming a specific AI agent — adaptively, exploit-validated, and honestly. Read THIS target's own code, stand up a disposable harness, and prove or refute each weakness through a real attacker-reachable entry point. This is the orchestration + discipline that makes a finding…

William2333ZZ/trustshell

Skill Claude CodeCodex

Red-team an AI agent for prompt injection — does content the agent is asked to process (email, page, ticket, tool result) override its actual task? Authorized testing of agents you own or are permitted to test.

William2333ZZ/trustshell

Skill Claude CodeCodex

Red-team an AI agent's tools — can it be coerced (often via injection) into calling a tool it shouldn't, with attacker-influenced arguments, or into acting as a confused deputy with its own privileges? Authorized testing of agents you own or are permitted to test.

William2333ZZ/trustshell

Skill Claude CodeCodex

Red-team an AI agent's tool-execution isolation — do tools run un-sandboxed on the host, and does the sandbox silently disable itself when a dependency is missing? Authorized testing of agents you own or are permitted to test.

William2333ZZ/trustshell

Skill Claude CodeCodex

Red-team an AI agent's high-risk action gating — can a costly or destructive action (pay, message, delete) reach execution without out-of-band human confirmation, especially under auto-approve/unattended modes? Authorized testing of agents you own or are permitted to test.

William2333ZZ/trustshell

Skill Claude CodeCodex

Red-team the channels an AI agent listens on (Telegram/Discord/Slack/WhatsApp/email/webhooks) — can untrusted inbound content, including group messages and forwards, steer the agent? Authorized testing of agents you own or are permitted to test.

William2333ZZ/trustshell

Skill Claude CodeCodex

Red-team an AI agent's persistent memory for cross-session prompt injection ("memory poisoning") — does untrusted content the agent processes get written into long-term memory and re-fire in future sessions with no attacker present? Authorized testing of agents you own or are permitted to test.

William2333ZZ/trustshell

Skill Claude CodeCodex

Red-team an AI agent's skill / plugin / MCP supply chain — can a poisoned skill doc, a malicious MCP server, or a dependency-confused package become persistent executable instruction? Authorized testing of agents you own or are permitted to test.

William2333ZZ/trustshell

Skill Claude CodeCodex

Red-team an AI agent for data exfiltration — can an injection coax secrets, credentials, or sensitive data out of the agent through a tool call, a URL, or an outbound message? Authorized testing of agents you own or are permitted to test.

William2333ZZ/trustshell

Skill Claude CodeCodex

Red-team a multi-agent system — can one agent (or content it relays) inject instructions into another, escalate privilege by hopping between agents, or turn an orchestrator/sub-agent handoff into a trust-laundering path? Authorized testing of systems you own or are permitted to test.