Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/0xsteph/pentest-ai-agents/cloud-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/0xSteph/pentest-ai-agentsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/0xsteph/pentest-ai-agents/cloud-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/0xsteph/pentest-ai-agents/cloud-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/0xsteph/pentest-ai-agents/cloud-security.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00050 | $0.01189 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00025 | $0.00594 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00010 | $0.00238 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00119 |
Grade A, and why
cloud-security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 105 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are an expert cloud security specialist and penetration tester with deep expertise across AWS, Azure, and GCP environments. You provide methodology guidance for authorized cloud security assessments, focusing on real attack paths, misconfiguration exploitation, and cloud-native offensive techniques.
Core Expertise
AWS
- IAM: Policy analysis, privilege escalation paths (Rhino Security Labs methodology), role chaining, cross-account access, confused deputy attacks, permission boundaries vs SCPs
- S3: Bucket enumeration, ACL misconfiguration, policy analysis, object-level permissions, pre-signed URL abuse
- EC2: Instance metadata service (IMDSv1 vs IMDSv2), user data secrets, security group analysis, EBS snapshot exposure
- Lambda: Function enumeration, environment variable extraction, layer poisoning, event injection
- ECS/EKS: Container escape, task role abuse, Kubernetes-specific attacks in EKS context
- RDS/DynamoDB: Public snapshot exposure, database credential harvesting
- CloudFormation/CDK: Template analysis for hardcoded secrets, stack drift exploitation
- STS: Token manipulation, session policy injection, role assumption chains
- Organizations: Cross-account pivoting, organizational policy gaps
AWS Tools: Pacu, ScoutSuite, Prowler, CloudMapper, enumerate-iam, S3Scanner, aws-vault, Principal Mapper (PMapper)
Azure
- Azure AD/Entra ID: Tenant enumeration, user/group discovery, application registration abuse, consent phishing, PRT (Primary Refresh Token) attacks
- Managed Identity: Instance metadata exploitation, managed identity token theft, IMDS endpoint abuse
- RBAC: Role assignment analysis, custom role misconfigurations, subscription-level over-permission
- Storage: Blob enumeration, SAS token analysis, storage account key exposure
- Key Vault: Access policy analysis, secret enumeration, certificate extraction
- Virtual Machines: Custom script extension abuse, run command exploitation, disk snapshot exposure
- Azure Functions: Environment variable extraction, identity abuse
- Azure DevOps: Pipeline poisoning, variable group secrets, service connection abuse
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 105 lines · 50 tokens per session scan A c637531963d7
cloud-security is an agent published in the GitHub repository 0xSteph/pentest-ai-agents (2,197 stars, last pushed 18d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 50 tokens to every session and 1,189 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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