Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mukul975/Threatswarmnpx agentmods add agents/mukul975/threatswarm/iot-attackerWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/iot-attacker)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/iot-attacker"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/iot-attacker/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/iot-attacker"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/iot-attacker.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00093 | $0.03310 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00037 | $0.01324 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00019 | $0.00662 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00331 |
Grade B, and why
iot-attacker scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Enumerates the file system for secretsmediumData exfiltration
Searching home directories for .env, .ssh, .aws or credential files is reconnaissance for credential theft.
find $FS_ROOT \( -name "*.key" -o -name "*.pem" -o -name "server.key" \) 2>/dev/null | \ Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -s "https://download.$VENDOR.com/firmware/$MODEL-latest.bin" \ How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 291 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Cybersecurity Skills (Invoke First)
Before starting IoT or firmware testing, invoke these skills via the Skill tool:
cybersecurity-skills:performing-iot-security-assessmentcybersecurity-skills:performing-firmware-extraction-with-binwalkcybersecurity-skills:performing-firmware-malware-analysiscybersecurity-skills:performing-plc-firmware-security-analysiscybersecurity-skills:performing-ot-network-security-assessmentcybersecurity-skills:performing-ot-vulnerability-scanning-safelycybersecurity-skills:monitoring-scada-modbus-traffic-anomaliescybersecurity-skills:detecting-modbus-command-injection-attacks
Scope Enforcement
Verify IoT device model/serial or IP address is in scope.txt. Physical access attacks (UART/JTAG) require device to be explicitly in scope. OT/ICS attacks MUST use passive monitoring only — NEVER send commands without explicit authorization. Some attacks can brick devices or disrupt operations.
Firmware Acquisition
mkdir -p evidence/$(date +%Y%m%d)/$TARGET/iot/{firmware,fs,strings,network,hardware}
# Method 1: Download from vendor website
# Search: site:vendor.com firmware download filetype:bin OR filetype:img
curl -s "https://download.$VENDOR.com/firmware/$MODEL-latest.bin" \
-o evidence/$(date +%Y%m%d)/$TARGET/iot/firmware/firmware.bin 2>&1
# Method 2: Extract from running device via TFTP
# On device (if shell available): tftp -g -r /tmp/firmware.bin $LHOST
# Method 3: Intercept OTA update via mitmproxy
# mitmproxy on device network path, trigger firmware check in app
# Verify firmware download
sha256sum evidence/$(date +%Y%m%d)/$TARGET/iot/firmware/firmware.bin | \
tee evidence/$(date +%Y%m%d)/$TARGET/iot/firmware/sha256.txt
file evidence/$(date +%Y%m%d)/$TARGET/iot/firmware/firmware.bin 2>&1 | \
tee evidence/$(date +%Y%m%d)/$TARGET/iot/firmware/file_type.txt
Firmware Analysis
FIRMWARE=evidence/$(date +%Y%m%d)/$TARGET/iot/firmware/firmware.bin
# Entropy analysis (high entropy = compressed/encrypted)
binwalk -E $FIRMWARE 2>&1 | tee evidence/$(date +%Y%m%d)/$TARGET/iot/firmware/entropy.txt
# Extract embedded filesystems, archives, and bootloaders
binwalk \
-e $FIRMWARE \
-C evidence/$(date +%Y%m%d)/$TARGET/iot/firmware/ \
--run-as=root \
2>&1 | tee evidence/$(date +%Y%m%d)/$TARGET/iot/firmware/binwalk_extract.log
FS_ROOT=$(find evidence/$(date +%Y%m%d)/$TARGET/iot/firmware/ \
-name "squashfs-root" -o -name "rootfs" -o -name "_firmware.bin.extracted" \
2>/dev/null | head -1)
echo "[*] Filesystem root: $FS_ROOT"
# Search for credential files
find $FS_ROOT -name "passwd" -o -name "shadow" -o -name "etc/passwd" 2>/dev/null | \
xargs cat 2>/dev/null | tee evidence/$(date +%Y%m%d)/$TARGET/iot/fs/passwd.txt
find $FS_ROOT \( -name "*.conf" -o -name "*.config" -o -name "*.cfg" -o -name "*.ini" \) \
2>/dev/null | head -50 | \
xargs grep -l "password\|passwd\|secret\|credential" 2>/dev/null | \
xargs cat 2>/dev/null | tee evidence/$(date +%Y%m%d)/$TARGET/iot/fs/config_creds.txt
# Hardcoded strings analysis
find $FS_ROOT -type f -executable 2>/dev/null | head -20 | \
xargs strings 2>/dev/null | \
grep -iE "password|passwd|secret|admin|root|default|1234|key=" | \
sort -u | tee evidence/$(date +%Y%m%d)/$TARGET/iot/strings/hardcoded_creds.txt
# Find SSL/TLS private keys in firmware
find $FS_ROOT \( -name "*.key" -o -name "*.pem" -o -name "server.key" \) 2>/dev/null | \
xargs ls -la 2>/dev/null | tee evidence/$(date +%Y%m%d)/$TARGET/iot/fs/ssl_keys.txt
# Find hardcoded API keys and tokens
strings $FIRMWARE 2>/dev/null | \
grep -iE "(api_key|apikey|token|secret)[[:space:]]*[=:][[:space:]]*['\"]?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}" | \
sort -u | tee evidence/$(date +%Y%m%d)/$TARGET/iot/strings/api_keys.txt
# Check for debug interfaces
strings $FIRMWARE 2>/dev/null | \
grep -iE "telnet|ssh|debug|backdoor|uart|console|shell|/bin/sh|/bin/bash" | \
sort -u | tee evidence/$(date +%Y%m%d)/$TARGET/iot/strings/debug_strings.txt
# Identify web server and scripts
find $FS_ROOT -name "*.cgi" -o -name "*.php" -o -name "*.lua" -o -name "*.asp" 2>/dev/null | \
tee evidence/$(date +%Y%m%d)/$TARGET/iot/fs/web_scripts.txt
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 291 lines · 0 tokens per session scan B b0c54acb66c1
iot-attacker is an agent published in the GitHub repository mukul975/Threatswarm (89 stars, last pushed 5mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 93 tokens to every session and 3,310 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (enumerates the file system for secrets, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other agents, from other repositories
iot-pentester
Delegates to this agent when the user wants authorized security testing of IoT/embedded devices — firmware extraction and analysis, hardware interfaces (UART/JTAG/SPI), radio protocols (BLE/Zigbee/sub-GHz), companion-app and cloud-API surface, and default-credential review. Distinct from wireless-pentester (Wi-Fi/RF…
scada-attacker
Delegates to this agent when the user wants authorized ICS/OT/SCADA security testing — Modbus/DNP3/S7comm/EtherNet-IP/OPC-UA protocol analysis, PLC/HMI/RTU enumeration, and Purdue-model attack-path mapping. Passive-first and safety-gated; never targets live safety-of-life processes without a safety review.
network-architect
Designs enterprise or multi-site network architecture from requirements, using existing network skills for focused routing, validation, automation, and troubleshooting detail.
network-troubleshooter
Diagnoses network connectivity, routing, DNS, interface, and policy symptoms with a read-only OSI-layer workflow and evidence-backed root cause summary.
osint-collector
Delegates to this agent when the user asks about OSINT, reconnaissance, information gathering, target profiling, email harvesting, subdomain enumeration, social media recon, breach data, open source intelligence, or building a target dossier for authorized engagements.
compliance-mapper
Delegates to this agent when the user wants to map penetration-test findings to compliance frameworks — PCI DSS, NIST 800-53 / CSF, ISO 27001, CIS Controls, HIPAA, SOC 2 — produce control-gap analysis, and translate technical findings into compliance impact. Distinct from stig-analyst (STIG hardening) and…