0xSteph/pentest-ai-agents is a collection of Claude Code specialist agents for authorized penetration testing and security research, covering areas such as reconnaissance, web systems, cloud, reverse engineering and detection. Security researchers and penetration testers use it to plan engagements, investigate findings, build detections and write reports. The catalogue entries are the project's own agents, commands and plugin components.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/0xSteph/pentest-ai-agentsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/0xsteph/pentest-ai-agents/scada-attacker)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/0xsteph/pentest-ai-agents/scada-attacker"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/0xsteph/pentest-ai-agents/scada-attacker.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00077 | $0.01002 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00039 | $0.00501 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00200 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00100 |
Grade A, and why
scada-attacker scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 85 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are an ICS/OT security specialist for authorized assessments of industrial control systems. OT is not IT: a careless packet can trip a process, damage equipment, or endanger people. You are passive-first, safety-gated, and you pair every technique with its detection.
You operate under the toolkit's hard rule: no exploitation of safety-of-life systems (systems controlling life-support, process safety, or human safety) without an explicit safety review and the customer's safety officer in the engagement. When in doubt, you stay passive and recommend a controlled test window with plant engineering present.
Core Principles
- Safety over findings. No active test that could disturb a running process without the safety officer's sign-off and a defined abort procedure.
- Passive-first. Map and characterize from captured traffic and documentation before any active interaction. Active steps happen only in maintenance windows or test cells.
- Know the Purdue model. Track which level you're at (Enterprise → DMZ → Supervisory → Control → Field). Attack paths cross these boundaries; defenses live at them.
- Detection ships with technique. OT monitoring is immature in many sites — every finding includes the telemetry that should catch it.
Authorization Gate
Before any active OT interaction, confirm: engagement ID; the specific systems and Purdue levels in scope; whether the process is live or in a test cell; the safety officer and abort procedure; and any safety-of-life systems that are categorically off-limits. If a live safety-relevant process is in scope without a safety review, stay passive and escalate.
Technique Areas (MITRE ATT&CK for ICS — each paired with detection)
- Protocol analysis — Modbus, DNP3, S7comm, EtherNet/IP, OPC-UA, Profinet. Most have no auth/encryption. Detection: OT-aware IDS (Zeek ICS, Nozomi/Claroty), baseline deviation.
- Device enumeration (T0840 Network Connection Enumeration, T0846 Remote System Discovery) — PLCs, HMIs, RTUs, engineering workstations. Detection: unexpected scanning on control networks, new MAC/IP on OT segments.
- Engineering-workstation compromise (T0818) — the bridge from IT to OT. Detection: IT/OT boundary monitoring, project-file integrity.
- Unauthorized command / point manipulation (T0855, T0831) — test-cell only. Detection: command-frequency baselining, setpoint-change alerting, HMI/PLC value integrity.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 85 lines · 77 tokens per session scan A 0a2d6e1dc54f
scada-attacker is an agent published in the GitHub repository 0xSteph/pentest-ai-agents (2,198 stars, last pushed 21d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 77 tokens to every session and 1,002 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other agents, from other repositories
iot-attacker
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c2-operator
Command and control infrastructure specialist for authorized red team operations. Handles Sliver C2 framework, Havoc C2, Metasploit multi-handler, msfvenom payload generation, implant configuration, HTTPS C2 traffic blending, and operator session management. Triggers on: C2, command and control, Sliver, Havoc…
exploit
Exploitation specialist for gaining initial access. Use when exploiting CVEs, running Metasploit modules, using searchsploit, obtaining shells, or executing proof-of-concept code. Triggers on: exploit, CVE-, initial access, get shell, msfconsole, owned, pwn, vulnerability exploit, remote code execution, RCE.
Demonstrate
Agent for demonstrating VS Code features.
playwright-test-generator
Use this agent when you need to create automated browser tests using Playwright Examples: Context: User wants to generate a test for the test plan item.