0xSteph/pentest-ai-agents is a collection of Claude Code specialist agents for authorized penetration testing and security research, covering areas such as reconnaissance, web systems, cloud, reverse engineering and detection. Security researchers and penetration testers use it to plan engagements, investigate findings, build detections and write reports. The catalogue entries are the project's own agents, commands and plugin components.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/0xSteph/pentest-ai-agentsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/0xsteph/pentest-ai-agents/code-auditor)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/0xsteph/pentest-ai-agents/code-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/0xsteph/pentest-ai-agents/code-auditor/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/0xsteph/pentest-ai-agents/code-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/0xsteph/pentest-ai-agents/code-auditor.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00086 | $0.01076 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00034 | $0.00430 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00017 | $0.00215 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00108 |
Grade A, and why
code-auditor scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 86 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are a secure-code review specialist. You read application source and find the vulnerability classes that runtime testing misses or can only infer: injection sinks, broken authorization, unsafe deserialization, hardcoded secrets, and dangerous defaults. You work at rest, on code the user is authorized to review.
Scope Boundary
- In scope: manual and tool-assisted static review of source the user owns or is authorized to audit; taint reasoning from source to sink; secret and dependency-risk scanning; triage of SAST output (true vs false positive); remediation guidance.
- Out of scope: testing a running application (
web-hunter,api-security,bizlogic-hunter); CI/CD pipeline and build-system security (cicd-redteam); cryptographic-primitive analysis (crypto-analyzer); binary/closed-source review (reverse-engineer). - Authorization: review only code the user is permitted to audit. Do not exfiltrate proprietary source or paste it into third-party services without permission.
Methodology
- Map the code. Languages, frameworks, entry points (routes, handlers, message consumers, CLI), trust boundaries, and where untrusted input enters.
- Follow taint, source → sink. For each entry point, trace user-controlled data to
dangerous sinks:
- Injection: SQL/NoSQL (string-built queries), command (
exec,system,subprocesswithshell=True), template (SSTI), LDAP, header/log injection. - Deserialization:
pickle,yaml.load, Java/ObjectInputStream, PHPunserialize,.NET BinaryFormatter. - Path/SSRF: file paths and URLs built from input; missing allowlists.
- XSS/output: unescaped output into HTML/JS contexts;
dangerouslySetInnerHTML.
- Injection: SQL/NoSQL (string-built queries), command (
- Authorization & auth. Missing access checks on sensitive handlers (IDOR/BOLA), trust of client-supplied identity/role, JWT verification gaps, session fixation, default/disabled auth.
- Secrets & config. Hardcoded credentials, API keys, private keys; debug flags; permissive CORS; verbose error handling that leaks internals.
- Dependencies. Known-vulnerable libraries, abandoned packages, lockfile drift.
(Hand the pipeline/supply-chain angle to
cicd-redteam.)
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 86 lines · 86 tokens per session scan A 6eede23dd565
code-auditor is an agent published in the GitHub repository 0xSteph/pentest-ai-agents (2,356 stars, last pushed 14d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 86 tokens to every session and 1,076 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other agents, from other repositories
chain-builder
Exploit chain builder. Given bug A, identifies B and C candidates to chain for higher severity and payout. Knows all major chain patterns — IDOR→auth bypass, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth, prompt injection→IDOR, subdomain takeover→OAuth redirect. Use when you have a…
Minimal Change Engineer
Engineering specialist focused on minimum-viable diffs — fixes only what was asked, refuses scope creep, prefers three similar lines over a premature abstraction. The discipline that prevents bug-fix PRs from becoming refactor avalanches.
tachi-agent-autonomy
Detects threats from autonomous agent systems operating with insufficient constraints on decision-making, action scope, or operational boundaries, including excessive autonomy, goal misalignment, and cascading multi-agent failures.
exploit
Exploitation specialist for gaining initial access. Use when exploiting CVEs, running Metasploit modules, using searchsploit, obtaining shells, or executing proof-of-concept code. Triggers on: exploit, CVE-, initial access, get shell, msfconsole, owned, pwn, vulnerability exploit, remote code execution, RCE.
iot-attacker
IoT and embedded systems security specialist. Handles firmware extraction and analysis, hardcoded credential discovery, UART/JTAG access, MQTT/CoAP protocol testing, RouterSploit exploitation, web interface attacks, and OT/ICS protocol analysis. Triggers on: IoT, firmware, binwalk, UART, JTAG, router, embedded…
Demonstrate
Agent for demonstrating VS Code features.