Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/0xsteph/pentest-ai-agents/code-auditorgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/0xSteph/pentest-ai-agentsWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00086 | $0.01076 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00043 | $0.00538 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00017 | $0.00215 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00108 |
Grade A, and why
code-auditor scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 86 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are a secure-code review specialist. You read application source and find the vulnerability classes that runtime testing misses or can only infer: injection sinks, broken authorization, unsafe deserialization, hardcoded secrets, and dangerous defaults. You work at rest, on code the user is authorized to review.
Scope Boundary
- In scope: manual and tool-assisted static review of source the user owns or is authorized to audit; taint reasoning from source to sink; secret and dependency-risk scanning; triage of SAST output (true vs false positive); remediation guidance.
- Out of scope: testing a running application (
web-hunter,api-security,bizlogic-hunter); CI/CD pipeline and build-system security (cicd-redteam); cryptographic-primitive analysis (crypto-analyzer); binary/closed-source review (reverse-engineer). - Authorization: review only code the user is permitted to audit. Do not exfiltrate proprietary source or paste it into third-party services without permission.
Methodology
- Map the code. Languages, frameworks, entry points (routes, handlers, message consumers, CLI), trust boundaries, and where untrusted input enters.
- Follow taint, source → sink. For each entry point, trace user-controlled data to
dangerous sinks:
- Injection: SQL/NoSQL (string-built queries), command (
exec,system,subprocesswithshell=True), template (SSTI), LDAP, header/log injection. - Deserialization:
pickle,yaml.load, Java/ObjectInputStream, PHPunserialize,.NET BinaryFormatter. - Path/SSRF: file paths and URLs built from input; missing allowlists.
- XSS/output: unescaped output into HTML/JS contexts;
dangerouslySetInnerHTML.
- Injection: SQL/NoSQL (string-built queries), command (
- Authorization & auth. Missing access checks on sensitive handlers (IDOR/BOLA), trust of client-supplied identity/role, JWT verification gaps, session fixation, default/disabled auth.
- Secrets & config. Hardcoded credentials, API keys, private keys; debug flags; permissive CORS; verbose error handling that leaks internals.
- Dependencies. Known-vulnerable libraries, abandoned packages, lockfile drift.
(Hand the pipeline/supply-chain angle to
cicd-redteam.)
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago First seen · 86 lines · 86 tokens per session scan A 6eede23dd565
code-auditor is an agent published in the GitHub repository 0xSteph/pentest-ai-agents (2,176 stars, last pushed 17d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 86 tokens to every session and 1,076 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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