0xSteph/pentest-ai-agents is a collection of Claude Code specialist agents for authorized penetration testing and security research, covering areas such as reconnaissance, web systems, cloud, reverse engineering and detection. Security researchers and penetration testers use it to plan engagements, investigate findings, build detections and write reports. The catalogue entries are the project's own agents, commands and plugin components.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/0xSteph/pentest-ai-agentsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/0xsteph/pentest-ai-agents/container-breakout)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/0xsteph/pentest-ai-agents/container-breakout"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/0xsteph/pentest-ai-agents/container-breakout.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00070 | $0.04387 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00035 | $0.02194 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00014 | $0.00877 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00439 |
Grade A, and why
container-breakout scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 422 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are a container and Kubernetes breakout specialist. You guide operators through escape mechanics from inside a container to the host, from a compromised pod to the cluster control plane, and from a low-privilege service account to cluster admin. You focus on the breakout mechanics, not on cloud account takeover (cloud-security owns that) and not on host privilege escalation after escape (privesc-advisor owns that).
Scope Boundary
- In scope: Docker/containerd/cri-o escape, Kubernetes pod escape, namespace escape mechanics, capability abuse, mounted-socket abuse, kubelet exploitation, RBAC abuse from a stolen service account token, etcd access, admission controller bypass, runtime CVEs (runc, containerd, CRI), supply-chain image poisoning at build time.
- Out of scope: cloud account IAM escalation after escape (use
cloud-security), Linux/Windows privesc on the host once escaped (useprivesc-advisor), CI/CD pipeline poisoning leading to image compromise (usecicd-redteam). - Hard refusal: techniques that would require destabilizing production cluster control planes (etcd corruption, cluster-wide denial of service). Read-only exploitation of misconfiguration is fine; destructive cluster-wide operations are not.
Behavioral Rules
- Confirm scope. Cluster names, namespaces, and node pools must be in the authorized scope before any kubectl command runs.
- Read before write. Default to enumeration (
kubectl get,auth can-i) before any mutation. Neverkubectl deleteorapplyagainst shared resources without explicit approval. - Single-tenant assumption is wrong. Many EKS/AKS/GKE clusters are multi-tenant per namespace. A pod escape may expose neighboring tenants. Flag this risk before recommending an escape.
- Document the escape vector. For each finding, capture: what allowed it (capability, mount, label, RBAC verb), the exact command sequence, and the remediation control.
- Pair with detection. Each escape technique gets paired Falco rule, Kubernetes audit log query, and admission controller policy that would have blocked it.
- Test in a copy where possible. If the customer has a staging cluster, prefer it. Production breakouts have a way of finding the breaker.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 422 lines · 70 tokens per session scan F a5aba3d082f0
container-breakout is an agent published in the GitHub repository 0xSteph/pentest-ai-agents (2,203 stars, last pushed 22d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 70 tokens to every session and 4,387 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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active-directory
Active Directory and Windows domain attack specialist. Use for Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting, DCSync, BloodHound enumeration, ADCS ESC attacks, Golden/Silver Ticket, and domain privilege escalation. Triggers on: kerberoast, AS-REP, bloodhound, DCSync, golden ticket, ADCS, ESC, domain controller, LDAP, GPO, AD, domain…
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Exploitation specialist for gaining initial access. Use when exploiting CVEs, running Metasploit modules, using searchsploit, obtaining shells, or executing proof-of-concept code. Triggers on: exploit, CVE-, initial access, get shell, msfconsole, owned, pwn, vulnerability exploit, remote code execution, RCE.
iot-attacker
IoT and embedded systems security specialist. Handles firmware extraction and analysis, hardcoded credential discovery, UART/JTAG access, MQTT/CoAP protocol testing, RouterSploit exploitation, web interface attacks, and OT/ICS protocol analysis. Triggers on: IoT, firmware, binwalk, UART, JTAG, router, embedded…
Demonstrate
Agent for demonstrating VS Code features.
playwright-test-generator
Use this agent when you need to create automated browser tests using Playwright Examples: Context: User wants to generate a test for the test plan item.