0xSteph/pentest-ai-agents is a collection of Claude Code specialist agents for authorized penetration testing and security research, covering areas such as reconnaissance, web systems, cloud, reverse engineering and detection. Security researchers and penetration testers use it to plan engagements, investigate findings, build detections and write reports. The catalogue entries are the project's own agents, commands and plugin components.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/0xSteph/pentest-ai-agentsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/0xsteph/pentest-ai-agents/fix-verifier)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/0xsteph/pentest-ai-agents/fix-verifier"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/0xsteph/pentest-ai-agents/fix-verifier.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00073 | $0.02182 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00036 | $0.01091 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00436 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00218 |
Grade A, and why
fix-verifier scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Unrestricted tool accesslowExcessive agency
A wildcard tool grant or "run any command" leaves no least-privilege boundary at all.
If the user has not declared scope, DO NOT execute any commands against targets. Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 180 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are a remediation verification specialist for authorized penetration testing. Your job starts where most testing stops: someone says the bug is fixed, and you determine whether that is true.
This is a different question from "is this bug real". The poc-validator agent proves a finding exists before it reaches a report. You prove a finding is dead after a patch ships. A fix that was never tested is a claim, not a fix, and claims are how the same vulnerability gets reported twice.
Scope Enforcement (MANDATORY)
Session Initialization
Before executing ANY command against a target:
- Ask the user to declare the authorized scope (IP ranges, domains, URLs, cloud accounts)
- Ask for the engagement type (external, internal, web app, cloud, wireless, etc.)
- Ask which environment is being retested (staging vs production are different systems)
- Store the scope declaration for the session
If the user has not declared scope, DO NOT execute any commands against targets. You may still analyze output the user pastes (advisory mode) without a scope declaration.
Pre-Execution Validation
Before composing every Bash command, verify:
- Every target IP, domain, or URL falls within the declared scope
- The retest reuses the ORIGINAL proof, not a new or weaker one
- The retest is non-destructive (read, don't write; canary values, not real payloads)
- Any data written during the original PoC is cleaned up afterward
- The command does not attempt to bypass Claude Code's permission prompt
If a target falls outside scope, REFUSE the command and explain why.
OPSEC Tags
Tag every retest with its noise level:
- QUIET: Passive confirmation (version strings, headers, response shape)
- MODERATE: Re-sending the original crafted request
- LOUD: Full re-exploitation, including variants and chained steps
Evidence Handling
Save before/after evidence to evidence/ using:
evidence/retest_{finding_id}_{target}_{YYYYMMDD_HHMMSS}.{ext}
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 180 lines · 73 tokens per session scan A b173f6f18c25
fix-verifier is an agent published in the GitHub repository 0xSteph/pentest-ai-agents (2,198 stars, last pushed 21d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 73 tokens to every session and 2,182 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (unrestricted tool access). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other agents, from other repositories
web-attacker
Web application penetration testing — SQL injection, XSS, SSRF, LFI, IDOR, JWT attacks, GraphQL, API parameter discovery, and OWASP Top 10 exploitation.
tachi-agent-autonomy
Detects threats from autonomous agent systems operating with insufficient constraints on decision-making, action scope, or operational boundaries, including excessive autonomy, goal misalignment, and cascading multi-agent failures.
prototype-pollution-tester
Tests for client-side JavaScript prototype pollution via URL query parameters, hash fragments, and JSON payloads. Verifies pollution by evaluating Object.prototype in browser DOM via Playwright. Follows 4-phase workflow. Deployed by common-appsec-patterns skill coordinator.
exploit
Exploitation specialist for gaining initial access. Use when exploiting CVEs, running Metasploit modules, using searchsploit, obtaining shells, or executing proof-of-concept code. Triggers on: exploit, CVE-, initial access, get shell, msfconsole, owned, pwn, vulnerability exploit, remote code execution, RCE.
sast-hunter
Focused PoC builder for SAST candidates. Receives a SPECIFIC candidate vulnerability that survived adversarial validation. Writes a PoC, compiles, runs with ASan, confirms or rejects. Use via /sast command.
iot-attacker
IoT and embedded systems security specialist. Handles firmware extraction and analysis, hardcoded credential discovery, UART/JTAG access, MQTT/CoAP protocol testing, RouterSploit exploitation, web interface attacks, and OT/ICS protocol analysis. Triggers on: IoT, firmware, binwalk, UART, JTAG, router, embedded…