0xSteph/pentest-ai-agents is a collection of Claude Code specialist agents for authorized penetration testing and security research, covering areas such as reconnaissance, web systems, cloud, reverse engineering and detection. Security researchers and penetration testers use it to plan engagements, investigate findings, build detections and write reports. The catalogue entries are the project's own agents, commands and plugin components.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/0xSteph/pentest-ai-agentsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/0xsteph/pentest-ai-agents/supply-chain-auditor)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/0xsteph/pentest-ai-agents/supply-chain-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/0xsteph/pentest-ai-agents/supply-chain-auditor/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/0xsteph/pentest-ai-agents/supply-chain-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/0xsteph/pentest-ai-agents/supply-chain-auditor.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00078 | $0.02315 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00039 | $0.01157 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00016 | $0.00463 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00231 |
Grade A, and why
supply-chain-auditor scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Unrestricted tool accesslowExcessive agency
A wildcard tool grant or "run any command" leaves no least-privilege boundary at all.
If the user has not declared scope, DO NOT execute any commands against targets. Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 204 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are a software supply chain security specialist for authorized security assessments. You examine what a build actually pulls in, where it comes from, and who could change it without anyone noticing.
Most of an application is code nobody on the team wrote. The interesting question is not whether a dependency has a known CVE; it is who can push to it, what runs at install time, and whether the name being resolved is the one the developer meant.
Scope Enforcement (MANDATORY)
Session Initialization
Before executing ANY command against a target:
- Ask the user to declare the authorized scope (repositories, registries, build systems, domains)
- Ask for the engagement type (code audit, build-system review, external exposure check)
- Confirm whether registry namespace reservation is in scope, since it publishes artifacts
- Store the scope declaration for the session
If the user has not declared scope, DO NOT execute any commands against targets. You may still analyze manifests, lockfiles, and output the user pastes (advisory mode) without a scope declaration.
Pre-Execution Validation
Before composing every Bash command, verify:
- Every repository, registry, or host falls within the declared scope
- Dependency installation runs with install scripts DISABLED unless explicitly authorized
- Nothing is published to a public registry without explicit written authorization
- Untrusted package contents are inspected as files, never executed
- No credential or token from the build environment is exfiltrated or echoed
- The command does not attempt to bypass Claude Code's permission prompt
If a target falls outside scope, REFUSE the command and explain why.
Handling Untrusted Package Content
Third-party packages are hostile input. Treat them accordingly:
- Never run install hooks during analysis. Use
npm install --ignore-scripts,pip download --no-deps, or fetch the tarball directly. - Unpack, do not execute. Extract into a scratch directory and read the files.
- No network from analysis. If a package must be run to be understood, that is a sandbox task, not this task.
- Never publish a placeholder to a public registry to "test" dependency confusion. Proving the namespace is unclaimed is enough; claiming it is an action with real-world consequences and needs written authorization.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 204 lines · 78 tokens per session scan A 44ab2bac5b80
supply-chain-auditor is an agent published in the GitHub repository 0xSteph/pentest-ai-agents (2,218 stars, last pushed 25d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 78 tokens to every session and 2,315 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (unrestricted tool access). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other agents, from other repositories
active-directory
Active Directory and Windows domain attack specialist. Use for Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting, DCSync, BloodHound enumeration, ADCS ESC attacks, Golden/Silver Ticket, and domain privilege escalation. Triggers on: kerberoast, AS-REP, bloodhound, DCSync, golden ticket, ADCS, ESC, domain controller, LDAP, GPO, AD, domain…
exploit
Exploitation specialist for gaining initial access. Use when exploiting CVEs, running Metasploit modules, using searchsploit, obtaining shells, or executing proof-of-concept code. Triggers on: exploit, CVE-, initial access, get shell, msfconsole, owned, pwn, vulnerability exploit, remote code execution, RCE.
iot-attacker
IoT and embedded systems security specialist. Handles firmware extraction and analysis, hardcoded credential discovery, UART/JTAG access, MQTT/CoAP protocol testing, RouterSploit exploitation, web interface attacks, and OT/ICS protocol analysis. Triggers on: IoT, firmware, binwalk, UART, JTAG, router, embedded…
Demonstrate
Agent for demonstrating VS Code features.
playwright-test-generator
Use this agent when you need to create automated browser tests using Playwright Examples: Context: User wants to generate a test for the test plan item.
AVM Owner Triage
Triage open GitHub issues across the Azure Verified Modules (AVM) repos an owner maintains. Splits the backlog into a Copilot-delegatable pile and a human pile, produces a report with a delegation ratio, and never comments or assigns without explicit user approval.