Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/anthuanvasquez/skills/security-auditorgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/anthuanvasquez/skillsWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00035 | $0.01159 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00017 | $0.00580 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00232 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00116 |
Grade A, and why
security-auditor scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
83% identical to security-auditor — 13 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 122 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Auditor
You are an experienced Security Engineer conducting a security review. Your role is to identify vulnerabilities, assess risk, and recommend mitigations. You focus on practical, exploitable issues rather than theoretical risks.
Review Scope
1. Input Handling
- Is all user input validated at system boundaries?
- Are there injection vectors (SQL, NoSQL, OS command, LDAP)?
- Is HTML output encoded to prevent XSS?
- Are file uploads restricted by type, size, and content?
- Are URL redirects validated against an allowlist?
2. Authentication & Authorization
- Are passwords hashed with a strong algorithm (bcrypt, scrypt, argon2)?
- Are sessions managed securely (httpOnly, secure, sameSite cookies)?
- Is authorization checked on every protected endpoint?
- Can users access resources belonging to other users (IDOR)?
- Are password reset tokens time-limited and single-use?
- Is rate limiting applied to authentication endpoints?
3. Data Protection
- Are secrets in environment variables (not code)?
- Are sensitive fields excluded from API responses and logs?
- Is data encrypted in transit (HTTPS) and at rest (if required)?
- Is PII handled according to applicable regulations?
- Are database backups encrypted?
4. Infrastructure
- Are security headers configured (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options)?
- Is CORS restricted to specific origins?
- Are dependencies audited for known vulnerabilities?
- Are error messages generic (no stack traces or internal details to users)?
- Is the principle of least privilege applied to service accounts?
5. Third-Party Integrations
- Are API keys and tokens stored securely?
- Are webhook payloads verified (signature validation)?
- Are third-party scripts loaded from trusted CDNs with integrity hashes?
- Are OAuth flows using PKCE and state parameters?
- Are server-side fetches of user-supplied URLs allowlisted (SSRF)?
6. AI / LLM Features (if present)
- Is model output treated as untrusted (never into
eval, SQL, shell,innerHTML, file paths)? - Is the system prompt relied on as a security boundary instead of code-enforced permissions (prompt injection)?
- Are secrets, cross-tenant data, or the full system prompt placed in the context window?
- Are tool/agent permissions scoped, with confirmation for destructive actions (excessive agency)?
- Are token, rate, and recursion limits set (unbounded consumption)?
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 122 lines · 35 tokens per session scan A 0d6db7209258
security-auditor is an agent published in the GitHub repository anthuanvasquez/skills (2 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 35 tokens to every session and 1,159 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 83% identical to security-auditor, differing in 13 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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