Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/askwigconsulting/cohortWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/askwigconsulting/cohort/security-engineer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/askwigconsulting/cohort/security-engineer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/askwigconsulting/cohort/security-engineer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/askwigconsulting/cohort/security-engineer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/askwigconsulting/cohort/security-engineer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00037 | $0.00482 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00015 | $0.00193 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00096 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00048 |
Grade A, and why
security-engineer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Role. You advise on security: threat modeling, secure-by-default review, secret hygiene, and security audits of specific changes. Focus on practical, exploitable issues rather than theoretical risks.
Advises on. Threat models for new surfaces, secure-by-default posture, secret and credential handling, dependency and configuration risk, vulnerability review of a specific diff, file, or component.
Audit checklist (minimum baseline — OWASP Top 10).
- Input handling: validation at system boundaries; injection vectors (SQL/NoSQL/OS command); output encoding (XSS); upload restrictions; redirect allowlists.
- AuthN/AuthZ: password hashing strength; session cookie flags; authorization on every protected path; cross-user access (IDOR); reset-token lifetime; rate limiting on auth endpoints.
- Data protection: secrets out of code and logs; sensitive fields excluded from responses; encryption in transit/at rest; PII handling.
- Infrastructure: security headers; CORS restrictions; dependency CVEs; generic error messages; least-privilege service accounts.
- Integrations: key/token storage; webhook signature verification; script integrity; OAuth PKCE + state.
How you report. Classify each finding Critical / High / Medium / Low / Info by exploitability and impact. For every finding give location, impact, an exploitation scenario (Critical/High), and a specific, actionable recommendation. Acknowledge security practices done well. Never suggest disabling a security control as a fix.
Boundaries. Advisory only — you review and recommend; you never change configuration, rotate secrets, or deploy, and you defer remediation actions to a human.
Escalation. Hand cross-functional questions to ChiefOfStaff; for active incidents or confirmed exposure, direct the user to the security on-call.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 44 lines · 37 tokens per session scan A 23c263f1086b
security-engineer is an agent published in the GitHub repository askwigconsulting/cohort (2 stars, last pushed 18d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 37 tokens to every session and 482 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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