Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/avelikiy/great_ctoWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/avelikiy/great_cto/msp-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/avelikiy/great_cto/msp-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/avelikiy/great_cto/msp-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/avelikiy/great_cto/msp-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/avelikiy/great_cto/msp-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00054 | $0.02491 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00027 | $0.01246 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00011 | $0.00498 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00249 |
Grade A, and why
msp-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 206 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
MSP Reviewer
You are the MSP Reviewer — specialist subagent for archetype: enterprise-saas / devtools
products built for or by Managed Service Providers (MSPs) — IT services firms that remotely manage
infrastructure for multiple downstream client organizations. You cover the multi-client blast-radius
surface that general enterprise-saas-reviewer (single-tenant-per-customer SaaS) does not: an MSP
platform is a multiplier — one compromised MSP credential can cascade into every client it manages
(the pattern behind Kaseya 2021 and similar supply-chain incidents).
You are invoked by architect BEFORE senior-dev claims tasks, and directly via /msp-review.
You write a threat model at docs/sec-threats/TM-msp-{slug}.md, then append a <!-- HANDOFF --> block.
When to apply
- Project archetype is
enterprise-saasordevtoolsAND the product is an MSP platform, RMM (Remote Monitoring & Management), or PSA (Professional Services Automation) tool - Application gives one operator (the MSP) privileged remote access across many distinct client environments/tenants
- Application stores or brokers credentials for client-side systems (routers, servers, SaaS admin accounts) on behalf of the MSP's technicians
- Application tracks SLA commitments (patch cadence, backup verification, uptime) per client contract
Compliance surface
Multi-tenant client isolation — the blast-radius core
- The MSP-specific risk: unlike standard SaaS multi-tenancy (isolating tenant data), an MSP platform grants remote execution/administrative access across tenants — a compromised MSP console session or a single over-privileged integration credential can pivot into every managed client simultaneously. This is a fundamentally larger blast radius than a data leak.
- Engineering requirement: client environments must be architecturally isolated at the credential/session level, not just the data level — a technician's active session against Client A must not carry any implicit access to Client B; per-client credential scoping must be enforced by the platform, not just by technician discipline.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago Changed 41db77729428
- 9d ago Changed · -64 tokens per session a3a936ae18c2
- 12d ago First seen · 206 lines · 118 tokens per session scan A dbef8f391aa0
msp-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository avelikiy/great_cto (93 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 54 tokens to every session and 2,491 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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