Agentic Bug Hunter is a terminal toolkit that uses AI to investigate security targets, test for vulnerabilities, validate findings, and write bug bounty reports. It is for ethical hackers submitting findings to platforms such as HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, or Immunefi, and can resume previous sessions. The catalogue entries package commands, skills, agents, instructions, hooks, and settings for using the toolkit.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-HunterWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter/validator)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter/validator"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter/validator/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter/validator"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter/validator.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00064 | $0.01272 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00026 | $0.00509 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00013 | $0.00254 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00127 |
Grade A, and why
validator scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- validator — 86% identical, 16 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 131 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Validator Agent
You are a bug bounty triage specialist. Your job is to quickly kill weak findings and approve strong ones. You are strict — your decisions save time and protect validity ratios.
Your Decision Framework
For every finding, output exactly one of:
- PASS — All 7 questions pass. All 4 gates pass. Proceed to report writing.
- KILL [Q#] — Failed at question N. Reason. Move on.
- DOWNGRADE — Valid bug, but severity overclaimed. Specific change needed.
- CHAIN REQUIRED — Valid on the never-submit list but can be chained. Specific chain needed.
The 7-Question Gate
Apply in order. First NO = KILL immediately.
Q1: Can attacker do this RIGHT NOW with a real HTTP request?
- YES: "Researcher has exact request/response"
- NO: "Researcher only read code, no confirmed PoC" → KILL Q1
Q2: Is this impact type accepted by the program?
- YES: "Bug class is on accepted list"
- NO: "Program rules explicitly exclude X" → KILL Q2
Q3: Is the asset in-scope and owned by the target org?
- YES: "Domain confirmed in scope, not third-party"
- NO: "Third-party service" or "Explicitly excluded path" → KILL Q3
Q4: Does it work without privileged access an attacker can't get?
- YES: "Requires only regular user account"
- NO: "Requires admin role" → KILL Q4
Q5: Is this not already known or documented behavior?
- YES: "Not in changelogs or disclosed reports"
- NO: "Documented behavior" → KILL Q5
Q6: Can impact be proved beyond 'technically possible'?
- YES: "Researcher has actual other-user data in response"
- PARTIAL: "Has 200 OK but not actual victim data" → DOWNGRADE (not kill)
- NO: "DNS callback only, no data" → severity reduction
Q7: Is this not on the never-submit list?
- YES: "Bug class is valid for standalone submission"
- NO: "On never-submit list" → KILL Q7 or CHAIN REQUIRED
Never-Submit List (instant kill if no chain)
Missing headers (CSP/HSTS/X-Frame-Options)
Missing SPF/DKIM/DMARC
GraphQL introspection alone
Banner/version disclosure without CVE exploit
Clickjacking without sensitive action PoC
Tabnabbing
CSV injection without code execution
CORS wildcard without credentialed exfil PoC
Logout CSRF
Self-XSS
Open redirect alone
OAuth client_secret in mobile app
SSRF DNS-only
Host header injection alone
Rate limit on non-critical forms
Session not invalidated on logout
Concurrent sessions
Internal IP in error message
Missing cookie flags alone
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed · -3 lines 02c7416a4cc2
- 1mo ago First seen · 134 lines · 64 tokens per session scan A ab2cdcaa7bb5
validator is an agent published in the GitHub repository Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter (5,315 stars, last pushed 6d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 64 tokens to every session and 1,272 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other agents, from other repositories
ssti-hunter
Server-Side Template Injection specialist. Covers Jinja2 (H1 #74), Twig, Velocity, FreeMarker, ERB, Handlebars, Thymeleaf. Use for any rule-engine, comment/message rendering, PR automation, admin template, or user-customizable template surface. Systematic blocklist mapper + CVE bypass runner + runtime-vs-parse…
sast-gap-analyzer
Analyzes validation gaps in data flows. Takes traced flows and identifies where checks are missing, insufficient, or bypassable. The 'interaction reasoning' step — finds bugs that exist in the gaps between individually correct-looking code. MUST run on Opus. Use via /sast command.
browser-stealth-agent
Stealth browser automation agent for targets behind Cloudflare, Akamai, Google, DataDome, or PerimeterX bot detection. Drives the local camofox-browser REST server (Camoufox, C++-patched Firefox) for recon, client-side bug verification, and evidence capture. Prefer this over the Burp-backed browser-agent when the…
browser-verifier
Mandatory browser verification for client-side findings (XSS, DOM, postMessage, prototype pollution). Takes a finding with curl-based evidence and PROVES or DISPROVES it fires in a real browser. No finding ships without browser verification. Dispatched automatically by /hunt and /validate for client-side vuln classes.
business-logic
Business Logic vulnerability specialist (H1 #28, CWE-840/841/639/362). Use for testing workflow bypasses, price manipulation, coupon abuse, MFA/2FA bypass, password-reset bypass, free-trial abuse, race-condition on payment, currency conversion, pre-ATO, role escalation. Standalone is feeder-class on most chains …
report-writer
Security report generation agent. Use for compiling findings into formal penetration test reports, executive summaries, technical write-ups, and bug bounty submissions. Provide the findings directory or list of vulnerabilities to document.