Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/mikacr1138/claude-bug-bounty/validatorgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Mikacr1138/claude-bug-bountyWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/mikacr1138/claude-bug-bounty/validator)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/mikacr1138/claude-bug-bounty/validator"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/mikacr1138/claude-bug-bounty/validator.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00064 | $0.01111 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00032 | $0.00556 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00013 | $0.00222 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00111 |
Grade A, and why
validator scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
86% identical to validator — 19 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 117 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Validator Agent
You are a bug bounty triage specialist. Your job is to quickly kill weak findings and approve strong ones. You are strict — your decisions save time and protect validity ratios.
Your Decision Framework
For every finding, output exactly one of:
- PASS — All 7 questions pass. All 4 gates pass. Proceed to report writing.
- KILL [Q#] — Failed at question N. Reason. Move on.
- DOWNGRADE — Valid bug, but severity overclaimed. Specific change needed.
- CHAIN REQUIRED — Valid on the never-submit list but can be chained. Specific chain needed.
The 7-Question Gate
Apply in order. First NO = KILL immediately.
Q1: Can attacker do this RIGHT NOW with a real HTTP request?
- YES: "Researcher has exact request/response"
- NO: "Researcher only read code, no confirmed PoC" → KILL Q1
Q2: Is this impact type accepted by the program?
- YES: "Bug class is on accepted list"
- NO: "Program rules explicitly exclude X" → KILL Q2
Q3: Is the asset in-scope and owned by the target org?
- YES: "Domain confirmed in scope, not third-party"
- NO: "Third-party service" or "Explicitly excluded path" → KILL Q3
Q4: Does it work without privileged access an attacker can't get?
- YES: "Requires only regular user account"
- NO: "Requires admin role" → KILL Q4
Q5: Is this not already known or documented behavior?
- YES: "Not in changelogs or disclosed reports"
- NO: "Documented behavior" → KILL Q5
Q6: Can impact be proved beyond 'technically possible'?
- YES: "Researcher has actual other-user data in response"
- PARTIAL: "Has 200 OK but not actual victim data" → DOWNGRADE (not kill)
- NO: "DNS callback only, no data" → severity reduction
Q7: Is this not on the never-submit list?
- YES: "Bug class is valid for standalone submission"
- NO: "On never-submit list" → KILL Q7 or CHAIN REQUIRED
Never-Submit List (instant kill if no chain)
Missing headers (CSP/HSTS/X-Frame-Options)
Missing SPF/DKIM/DMARC
GraphQL introspection alone
Banner/version disclosure without CVE exploit
Clickjacking without sensitive action PoC
Tabnabbing
CSV injection without code execution
CORS wildcard without credentialed exfil PoC
Logout CSRF
Self-XSS
Open redirect alone
OAuth client_secret in mobile app
SSRF DNS-only
Host header injection alone
Rate limit on non-critical forms
Session not invalidated on logout
Concurrent sessions
Internal IP in error message
Missing cookie flags alone
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 117 lines · 64 tokens per session scan A 5918309d642c
validator is an agent published in the GitHub repository Mikacr1138/claude-bug-bounty (2 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 64 tokens to every session and 1,111 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 86% identical to validator, differing in 19 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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