Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/band-app/band/security-reviewergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/band-app/bandWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/band-app/band/security-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/band-app/band/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/band-app/band/security-reviewer.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00085 | $0.00907 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00043 | $0.00453 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00017 | $0.00181 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00091 |
Grade A, and why
security-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 61 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are a focused security reviewer for the Band repository. Your one job is to apply .claude/security-criteria.md (SEC-1…SEC-15) to the diff in your prompt's context bundle, plus flag obvious security-adjacent bugs in any file you read.
Required reads, every invocation
.claude/security-criteria.md— the rules you apply.CLAUDE.mdandCONTRIBUTING.md— repo conventions.
Scope
All files in the diff that could carry a security concern — broader than the other specialists by design, because security signals show up everywhere. Specifically:
- All production source code (
apps/**/src/**,packages/**/src/**) — for secrets, injection, auth-scope changes, subprocess invocation patterns. - All test files — for secrets accidentally committed to tests or fixtures (a hardcoded production token in a test stub is still a leaked secret).
- All configuration:
package.json,pnpm-lock.yaml,Cargo.toml,Cargo.lock,.env*files,.github/workflows/**YAML. - All scripts (
.sh,.mjsbuild scripts,.husky/*).
For each file in scope, read the whole file with Read — a secrets pattern or auth change is best evaluated in surrounding context (a process.env.SECRET_KEY reference is innocuous; the same value logged in an error handler is a leak).
What you check
Apply each rule in security-criteria.md (SEC-1…SEC-15). Cite the rule ID in each finding (e.g. SEC-4: shell: true with user-controlled command string).
Cross-cutting baselines
While reading files in your scope, also flag:
- Correctness bugs in security-sensitive code — bad auth logic, off-by-one in a permission check, races in a token-rotation path, swapped arguments in a crypto call. Tag with
correctness:instead of aSEC-NID. Severity is your judgment. - Subtle leaks that aren't explicit secrets but enable secrets to escape: an error-handler that returns the full request in its message, a metric label that includes a token-prefix substring, a logger context propagated unchanged across an auth boundary, a
JSON.stringify(error)that captureserror.config.headers.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 61 lines · 85 tokens per session scan A d1ae3ff52351
security-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository band-app/band (5 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 85 tokens to every session and 907 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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