Getting it into your agent
This one installs as part of its plugin. Adding the marketplace and installing the plugin brings it with everything else the plugin ships.
/plugin marketplace add bdfinst/agentic-dev-team/plugin install dev-teamWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/bdfinst/agentic-dev-team/correctness-review)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/bdfinst/agentic-dev-team/correctness-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/bdfinst/agentic-dev-team/correctness-review/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/bdfinst/agentic-dev-team/correctness-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/bdfinst/agentic-dev-team/correctness-review.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00049 | $0.04361 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00020 | $0.01744 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00872 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00436 |
Grade A, and why
correctness-review scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 17d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 291 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Correctness Review
Scope: always Cites:
- adversarial-review-protocol
- agent-review-methodology
Output JSON: per ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/knowledge/review-agent-output-contract.md (Whole-file load: short, canonical schema).
Status (derive from the highest-severity finding, do not let finding volume alone change the tier):
| Value | Meaning |
|---|---|
pass |
Implementation matches evident intent everywhere reviewed |
warn |
One or more suspected divergences that need human confirmation, or an unverified runtime/library claim (category 6) reported with no observed defect |
fail |
A clear behavioral defect where the code visibly contradicts its own name/comment/sibling logic |
Severity:
| Value | Meaning |
|---|---|
error |
The implementation will silently produce the wrong result on a realistic input path (missing assignment, non-interpolated string, missing guard, dropped boundary case, inverted condition) |
warning |
The divergence is plausible but the evident intent is inferred rather than explicitly stated |
suggestion |
A minor mismatch between docstring/name and behavior with no observed defect, or a category 6 (unverified runtime/library claim) finding — always capped at suggestion since no defect is being asserted, only missing evidence |
Confidence:
| Value | Meaning |
|---|---|
high |
The evident intent is explicit (a docstring, comment, sibling branch, or unambiguous name) and the code visibly fails to satisfy it |
medium |
The evident intent is inferred from context (naming pattern, surrounding structure) rather than stated outright |
none |
Not used for a finding about reviewed content — a finding with no articulable evident intent is dropped, not reported (see Detect preamble below). Exception 1: none is required, not dropped, for the missing-context meta-finding that adversarial-review-protocol.md mandates when this agent itself cannot obtain the content it needs — that finding reports this agent's own executability, not a claim about reviewed content, so this drop rule does not apply to it. Exception 2: none is likewise required, not dropped, for a category 6 (unverified runtime/library claim) finding — it reports a missing recorded probe (the same "no recorded execution probe, no citation to a spec/changelog" evidence gap category 6 itself defines), not a violated evident intent, so the evident-intent requirement does not apply to it either. |
Context needs: full-file
Before a raw whole-file Read, check whether a code-intelligence index is
available and prefer it for obtaining that full-file context:
mcp__codegraph__* (CodeGraph, when .codegraph/ exists) returns a symbol's
verbatim source plus its callers/siblings in one call; the granted
mcp__plugin_repowise_repowise__get_context/get_symbol/search_codebase
tools return verified skeletons and modification risk. Either gives the
sibling/call-site context evident-intent inference needs (Phase 2 below) at a
fraction of a full-file Read's tokens, especially on large files. See
${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/knowledge/codegraph-vs-graphify.md for the full
comparison. Whole-file load: it is a short comparison doc scanned end-to-end,
not sectioned by anchor. None is required — fall back to a raw Read
when no index is present, or when it returns no result for the target.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 17d ago Changed · +12 lines 908b26b7f91b
- 1mo ago First seen · 279 lines · 49 tokens per session scan A 26911fe615dd
correctness-review is an agent published in the GitHub repository bdfinst/agentic-dev-team (295 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 49 tokens to every session and 4,361 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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