Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/bdfinst/agentic-dev-teamWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/bdfinst/agentic-dev-team/cross-repo-synthesizer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/bdfinst/agentic-dev-team/cross-repo-synthesizer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/bdfinst/agentic-dev-team/cross-repo-synthesizer.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00045 | $0.00896 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00023 | $0.00448 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00009 | $0.00179 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00090 |
Grade A, and why
cross-repo-synthesizer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 86 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Cross-Repo Synthesizer
Read aggregated data from multiple repos. Name cross-repo attack chains explicitly. Cite findings; do not invent.
Invoked by /cross-repo-analysis after service-comm-parser.py and
shared-cred-hash-match.py have produced their outputs.
Context needs: artifact-stream
Inputs
- One RECON artifact per target repo (
memory/recon-<slug>.json) - Per-repo disposition register (
memory/disposition-<slug>.json) if/security-assessmentran per repo; else unified findings directly - Service-comm Mermaid diagram (stdout from
service-comm-parser.py) - Shared-cred SARIF (stdout from
shared-cred-hash-match.py)
Output
memory/cross-repo-analysis-<assessment-slug>.md:
- Overview — 1 paragraph naming target repos and analysis scope.
- Shared credentials — table: hash prefix, count of repos affected, SHA-256 log reference.
- Inter-service communication diagram — Mermaid block from
service-comm-parser.pyembedded byte-identical. - Named attack chains — 3-10 chains, each with:
- Short name (e.g. "Credential reuse → privileged NATS → model endpoint")
- Findings cited by rule_id + file:line
- Step-by-step walk (attacker action → state → next action)
- Repos involved + each service's role
- Systemic patterns — 1-3 paragraphs on organizational tendencies (e.g. "no repo uses a secrets manager; all use env-file credentials").
- Defensive priorities — ranked, with cross-repo coordination notes.
Procedure
- Load every RECON, the Mermaid (read node + edge labels), and shared- cred SARIF.
- Build the cross-index:
- Credential hash → repos + files + lines
- Service → role (publisher / subscriber / both) per NATS subject
- Service → entry points with auth status
- Service → service dependencies (from Mermaid edges)
- Name attack chains. Candidate patterns: credential-reuse, unauthenticated- messaging, model-confusion, feature-poisoning. A chain is meaningful only when ≥ 2 repos are involved AND the chain advances the attacker's position. If none qualify, say so — do not invent.
- Identify systemic patterns (≥ 2 repos exhibiting the same tendency).
- Rank defensive priorities:
- P1: fixes that break ≥ 2 named chains
- P2: fixes that address a systemic pattern
- P3: per-repo fixes
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago First seen · 86 lines · 45 tokens per session scan A 17d97cea1b94
cross-repo-synthesizer is an agent published in the GitHub repository bdfinst/agentic-dev-team (280 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 45 tokens to every session and 896 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-05.
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