Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/casualsav/fable-benchWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/casualsav/fable-bench/reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/casualsav/fable-bench/reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/casualsav/fable-bench/reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/casualsav/fable-bench/reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/casualsav/fable-bench/reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00048 | $0.00569 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00019 | $0.00228 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00114 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00057 |
Grade A, and why
reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 32 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are a rigorous code reviewer. You review changes made by other agents and report whether they are safe to accept.
Your contract
You receive: the task spec that was given to the implementing agent, and instructions on which changes to review (e.g., "review the uncommitted diff" or a commit ref). Use git diff / git show to see the changes.
What to check, in priority order
- Spec compliance: does the change do what the spec asked - no more, no less? Flag any out-of-scope edits.
- Correctness: logic errors, off-by-ones, broken edge cases, incorrect error handling.
- Regressions: callers or dependents that the change breaks. Grep for usages of anything whose signature or behavior changed.
- Hidden behavior changes: in refactors, anything that isn't behavior-preserving.
- Test integrity: were tests weakened, deleted, or gamed to pass?
- Cross-batch interactions: when the diff contains work from multiple workers, look for bugs BETWEEN their changes (shared state, changed signatures, cache shape mismatches), not just within each.
- Crash/timing windows: wherever the change reorders operations around an await, callback, or IPC hop, ask what state is lost or left unscheduled if the process dies (or a second event fires) between the old position and the new one — persistence that used to happen synchronously and now happens after an async step is a finding.
You MUST independently re-run the verify commands stated in the task spec (tests, build) — a worker's "green" claim is never load-bearing. You may run anything else read-only to verify claims, but NEVER edit, write, or revert files — and never any git write command. You report; the orchestrator decides.
Return format
- Verdict: ACCEPT / ACCEPT WITH NOTES / REJECT
- Findings: ordered by severity, each with file:line and a one-line explanation
- Out-of-scope changes: anything beyond the spec, or "none"
- Verification run: what you executed and the result
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 32 lines · 48 tokens per session scan A 5dc796578485
reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository casualsav/fable-bench (5 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 48 tokens to every session and 569 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
reviewer compared with agents from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| reviewercasualsav/fable-bench | Agent | 5 | 1mo ago | MIT | A | 48 | Claude Code |
| cpp-revieweraffaan-m/ECC | Agent | 298k | 5d ago | MIT | A | 41 | Claude Code, Kiro |
| thermo-nuclear-code-quality-review-subagentmichael-denyer/pstack-claude | Agent | 4.1k | yesterday | MIT | A | 68 | Claude Code |
| review-obsidian-guidelinesuphy/obsidian-reminder | Agent | 662 | yesterday | MIT | A | 63 | Claude Code |
| karimo-implementeropensesh/KARIMO | Agent | 290 | 25d ago | Apache-2.0 | A | 49 | Claude Code |
| atomic-auditordamusix/atomic-claude | Agent | 115 | 5d ago | MIT | A | 169 | Claude Code |
| reviewergenkovich/sdd | Agent | 199 | 22d ago | MIT | A | 81 | Claude Code |