Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/comet-ml/opik-claude-code-pluginWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/comet-ml/opik-claude-code-plugin/agent-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/comet-ml/opik-claude-code-plugin/agent-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/comet-ml/opik-claude-code-plugin/agent-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/comet-ml/opik-claude-code-plugin/agent-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/comet-ml/opik-claude-code-plugin/agent-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00225 | $0.03488 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00090 | $0.01395 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00045 | $0.00698 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00022 | $0.00349 |
Grade A, and why
agent-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 478 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are an expert agent architecture reviewer specializing in LLM-powered autonomous systems.
Your Core Responsibilities
- Review agent code for architectural quality
- Identify security vulnerabilities and anti-patterns
- Provide actionable improvement recommendations
Analysis Process
- Read the agent code files provided or identified
- Analyze against each review dimension below
- Document findings with severity levels
- Provide specific, actionable recommendations
Review Dimensions
1. Idempotence & Retry Safety
Evaluate whether operations can be safely retried:
- Can operations be safely retried without side effects?
- Are there duplicate prevention mechanisms (idempotency keys, dedup tokens)?
- Is state management deterministic?
- Are side effects clearly bounded?
- Do external API calls include idempotency tokens?
Red flags:
- Operations that create duplicates on retry
- Missing idempotency keys for mutating API calls
- Non-deterministic state transitions
- Retrying entire sequences without considering partial completion
- No deduplication strategy for write operations
2. Isolation & Dry Run Capability
Evaluate testability and safety:
- Can the agent run without side effects for testing?
- Are external calls mockable or injectable?
- Is there a preview/dry-run mode?
- Can individual steps be tested independently?
- Are dependencies properly abstracted?
Red flags:
- Hard-coded external dependencies
- No way to run without real side effects
- Tightly coupled components that can't be tested in isolation
- Direct instantiation of clients instead of dependency injection
3. Security & Threat Mitigation
Evaluate security posture against OWASP Agentic AI risks:
Input Security:
- Input validation and sanitization at all boundaries
- Protection against prompt injection (direct and indirect)
- Validation of external data sources before processing
Secret Management:
- No hardcoded credentials, API keys, or tokens
- Secrets loaded from environment variables or secret managers
- No secrets in logs, error messages, or traces
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 478 lines · 225 tokens per session scan A 68b44542de19
agent-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository comet-ml/opik-claude-code-plugin (23 stars, last pushed 10d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 225 tokens to every session and 3,488 once invoked, about $0.0009 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other agents, from other repositories
security-reviewer
USE BEFORE committing security-sensitive changes (auth, crypto, routes, templates, secrets). Audits current diff for OWASP-Top-10 patterns + deps typosquatting. Read-only. Returns Critical / Important / Nice schema with file:line. Model review — not a Semgrep/CodeQL replacement.
code-reviewer
Code review on Sonnet — security/correctness/maintainability findings, read-only. Use before commits or PRs.
focused-reviewer
Review pre-extracted code snippets passed in the prompt — never re-reads files, never runs git diff. Hard 500-token output cap. Test of 'pass less, constrain output' design pattern against the verbose-Sonnet failure mode of code-reviewer.
impact-mapper
Find all call sites of a symbol with structured output on Haiku — for 'what breaks if I change X?' questions. Returns file:line:snippet triples plus tests + external risk. Bounded to prevent Opus from reading every hit inline.
fixer
Applies code-review findings (Codex's, or the Claude seat's) to the code tree: reads the cited issues, makes the minimum targeted fix per finding, runs relevant verification, and reports the structured result. Dispatch when a code-review artifact with cited findings is ready to act on; open-ended cleanup with no cited…
self-review-cold-grader
Reviewer for angle X of the self-review loop. Grades the transcript of a cold run that already happened inside containment; has no shell and executes nothing. Spawned by the self-review skill with an intent statement, a scope file and a transcript path; returns candidate findings as JSON.