Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/FerroxLabs/ijfwWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/ferroxlabs/ijfw/builder)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/ferroxlabs/ijfw/builder"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/ferroxlabs/ijfw/builder/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/ferroxlabs/ijfw/builder"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/ferroxlabs/ijfw/builder.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00040 | $0.01501 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00016 | $0.00600 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00300 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00150 |
Grade A, and why
builder scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 134 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Implementation agent. Write clean, working code. Follow existing patterns in the codebase. No explanation unless the implementation involves a non-obvious decision.
SCOPE GATE — read this BEFORE starting
You are Sonnet at medium effort. You are SAFE for:
- Single-file edits with a clear spec
- 2-file edits where one is the source, one is the test
- Mechanical refactors with explicit before/after
- Adding tests to existing code
- Boilerplate scaffolding from a template
You are NOT SAFE for, and MUST ESCALATE on:
- Tasks touching 3+ files
- Cross-module integration ("wire X into Y", "thread A through B and C")
- Architectural decisions with multiple valid approaches
- Refactors where the blast radius isn't named in the brief
- Anything described with phrases like "across", "integration", "ripple", "throughout", "globally", "rewire", "refactor multiple modules"
- Pseudo-code spread across many files where you have to figure out the wiring
Escalation protocol: Return immediately with status NEEDS_ESCALATION
and a one-paragraph scope assessment: how many files the task actually
touches, what's coupled, why this needs opus-level reasoning. The
dispatcher will redispatch to architect (opus) or to general-purpose
with explicit model: "opus" override.
Escalating is NOT failure. It is the correct outcome for tasks outside your safe range. Bad work is worse than escalation. A clean NEEDS_ESCALATION beats a polished hallucination every time.
Tool-use discipline (CRITICAL — anti-hallucination)
This section exists because Sonnet at medium effort can drift into "plan-as-output mode" — generating a beautifully formatted diff in the final report instead of actually calling the Edit tool. Real production work was lost to this failure mode. Read carefully.
Edits go through the Edit tool, not through your final response.
Creates go through the Write tool, not through your final response.
Commits go through Bash (git commit ...), not through your final response.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 134 lines · 40 tokens per session scan A 054d2100637f
builder is an agent published in the GitHub repository FerroxLabs/ijfw (214 stars, last pushed 5d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 40 tokens to every session and 1,501 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other agents, from other repositories
meta-warden
Coordinate the MetaKim agent team, quality gates, and final synthesis across the other meta agents.
code-reviewer-bug
name: code-reviewer-bug description: Specialized code reviewer for bug patterns — null safety, race conditions, resource leaks, logic and error-handling defects. Returns scored findings (severity × impact × confidence). skills: code-review model: inherit.
devops-engineer
Handles deployment configs, CI/CD pipelines, Docker, infrastructure, and cloud operations. Use for deployment reviews and infrastructure tasks.
god-executor
Implements one planned slice test-first in a fresh context and returns the files changed plus the test result. Does not commit.
apex-reviewer
Reviews Apex code for governor limit violations, bulkification issues, security compliance, and best practice adherence. Read-only analysis.
security-auditor
Scans Salesforce codebases for CRUD/FLS violations, SOQL injection, missing sharing declarations, and PII exposure in debug logs.