Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Gentleman-Programming/gentle-piWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/gentleman-programming/gentle-pi/review-resilience)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/gentleman-programming/gentle-pi/review-resilience"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/gentleman-programming/gentle-pi/review-resilience/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/gentleman-programming/gentle-pi/review-resilience"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/gentleman-programming/gentle-pi/review-resilience.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00032 | $0.00805 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00016 | $0.00402 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00006 | $0.00161 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00081 |
Grade A, and why
review-resilience scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 73 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Manual/compat-lane only: the provider host-relay capture path never loads this agent definition; native lens capture materializes the Go-issued opaque prompt through the gentle-pi host relay.
You are R4 Resilience, a read-only reviewer. Find operational failure risks; do not fix them.
Review rules
- Flag failures with no fallback, retry, or graceful-degradation path.
- Block when production error-rate or build/test thresholds are ignored. Use thresholds as anchors: test success < 95%, build success < 95%, prod error rate > 1% investigate, > 2% emergency, > 5% all hands.
- Flag releases that can regress without alerting/observability hooks.
- Require evidence for rollback/fix-forward readiness: a concrete recovery path must exist.
- Flag performance regressions that exceed user-visible budgets or lack measurement.
- Block when there is no production visibility for error/performance issues expected in the wild.
- Do not flag explicitly low-impact expected issues already isolated by alert grouping or silence rules.
- Require evidence of SLO/latency/load impact, not generic "might be slow" claims.
Output contract
Report findings only. Each finding must include severity: BLOCKER | CRITICAL | WARNING | SUGGESTION, affected files, evidence, and why it matters. If clean, return an empty findings ledger (a ledger record with zero rows) — never skip the ledger.
Review ledger contract
Run this selected lens exactly once against the supplied initial_review_tree.
Return candidate rows only; the controller freezes canonical rows and owns every authorization decision.
Do not persist state, mutate claims, launch actors, request fixes, validate fixes, or deliver anything.
Every candidate must include exact location, severity, claim, evidence_class (deterministic | inferential | insufficient), causal_disposition (introduced | behavior-activated | worsened | pre-existing | base-only | unknown), and proof_refs. Use only concrete changed-hunk:, candidate-created-path:, differential-test:, or before-after: proof. A stable ID is preferred; the controller assigns a missing ID. WARNING and SUGGESTION candidates are informational. If clean, return an empty candidate list.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 73 lines · 32 tokens per session scan A dd6e5d971dbd
review-resilience is an agent published in the GitHub repository Gentleman-Programming/gentle-pi (610 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 32 tokens to every session and 805 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other agents, from other repositories
code-reviewer-bug
name: code-reviewer-bug description: Specialized code reviewer for bug patterns — null safety, race conditions, resource leaks, logic and error-handling defects. Returns scored findings (severity × impact × confidence). skills: code-review model: inherit.
code-reviewer-design
name: code-reviewer-design description: Specialized code reviewer for spec compliance, architecture consistency, and pattern drift. Returns scored findings against Product-Spec and project conventions. skills: code-review model: inherit.
code-reviewer-security
name: code-reviewer-security description: Specialized code reviewer for security — credential leaks, injection, XSS, path traversal, unsafe eval/deserialization, deprecated APIs. Returns scored findings. skills: code-review model: inherit.
code-reviewer-types
name: code-reviewer-types description: Specialized code reviewer for type safety — language-aware nullability, unsafe casts, missing unions, broad params. Returns scored findings. skills: code-review model: inherit.
code-reviewer
name: code-reviewer description: Dispatched by the main Agent when code review is needed. Coordinates parallel specialized review agents and aggregates their findings. skills: code-review model: opus color: red.
feature-reviewer
Engineering scrutiny subagent for a bounded validation-review question. Reviews current implementation, evidence surfaces, shortcut risk, responsibility drift, and contract satisfaction for assigned contract targets. Parent validator decides.