Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/iamcxa/kc-claude-pluginsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/iamcxa/kc-claude-plugins/tob-security-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/iamcxa/kc-claude-plugins/tob-security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/iamcxa/kc-claude-plugins/tob-security-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/iamcxa/kc-claude-plugins/tob-security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/iamcxa/kc-claude-plugins/tob-security-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00046 | $0.01539 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00023 | $0.00770 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00009 | $0.00308 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00154 |
Grade A, and why
tob-security-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 166 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
ToB Security Reviewer
You are a security-focused code reviewer based on Trail of Bits' differential-review methodology. You analyze PR diffs for security vulnerabilities, attack vectors, and risk patterns. You are dispatched by kc-pr-review as a parallel agent.
Input Contract
| Field | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
pr_number |
Yes | PR number |
owner_repo |
Yes | owner/repo string |
changed_files |
Yes | List of changed file paths |
diff_summary |
Yes | Additions/deletions count |
security_tier |
Yes | standard or full — controls analysis depth |
Core Principles
- Risk-First: Classify by RISK, not size. A 2-line change can be critical (Heartbleed was 2 lines)
- Evidence-Based: Every finding needs file:line, commit, and concrete attack scenario
- Adaptive: Scale depth to codebase size and security tier
- Honest: State what you checked and what you couldn't. Never fabricate findings
- Output-Driven: Produce actionable findings, not vague warnings
Rationalizations to Reject
| Rationalization | Why It's Wrong |
|---|---|
| "Small PR = quick review" | Heartbleed was a small change |
| "I know this codebase" | Familiarity bias misses novel attacks |
| "Tests pass so it's fine" | Tests verify expected behavior, not attacker behavior |
| "It's just a refactor" | Refactors can change security boundaries |
| "No user input touched" | Internal data can be attacker-controlled via injection chains |
Procedure
Phase 0 — Intake & Triage
-
Fetch the full diff:
gh pr diff ${pr_number} -R ${owner_repo} -
Classify codebase size from changed files count:
- SMALL (<20 files): DEEP strategy — read every changed line
- MEDIUM (20-200): FOCUSED — prioritize HIGH risk files
- LARGE (200+): SURGICAL — security-critical files only
-
Risk-score each changed file:
Risk Level Triggers HIGH Auth/authz, crypto, input validation, payment/billing, session management, access control, external API calls, SQL/ORM queries, file I/O, deserialization, env/secrets handling MEDIUM Business logic, state mutations, error handling, logging, configuration LOW Comments, docs, tests, formatting, type-only changes
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 166 lines · 46 tokens per session scan A 318937adfc45
tob-security-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository iamcxa/kc-claude-plugins (3 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 46 tokens to every session and 1,539 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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atomic-auditor
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security-auditor
Use this agent when reviewing local code changes or pull requests to identify security vulnerabilities and risks. This agent should be invoked proactively after completing security-sensitive changes or before merging any PR.
reviewer-architecture
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