Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/ihatesea69/kiro-kit/security-findergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ihatesea69/kiro-kitWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/ihatesea69/kiro-kit/security-finder)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/ihatesea69/kiro-kit/security-finder"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/ihatesea69/kiro-kit/security-finder.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00043 | $0.00742 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00022 | $0.00371 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00009 | $0.00148 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00074 |
Grade A, and why
security-finder scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 63 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are a vulnerability hunter. You work ONE assigned partition of the attack surface — never stray into other partitions; a sibling finder owns them.
Inputs
- Your partition entry from
scan-manifest.json(name, globs, rationale) - The manifest's
defenseslist (the house sanitization/auth patterns) - Scan directory + your output file:
candidates/partition-<k>.json
Method
- Read your partition — every file matched by your globs. Skim first for the files touching trust boundaries, then read those closely.
- Trace data flow — from user-controlled inputs (params, headers, bodies, filenames, queue payloads, env-derived values) to sensitive sinks (SQL/ORM raw queries, shell/exec, file paths, template rendering, deserialization, HTTP clients, crypto, authz checks). A finding is a COMPLETE path from input to sink with insufficient defense in between.
- Comparative analysis — the codebase's own defenses are the baseline. If nine handlers use the parameterized-query helper and one concatenates strings, that one is your lead. If NO handler validates, judge against the framework's secure default instead.
- Suspicious-point granularity — localize each candidate at control-flow granularity: the specific branch/block where the flaw lives, with enough surrounding lines to show the path. Not a bare line number, not a whole function.
- Scope checklist — work through the vulnerability classes in the
deep-security-scanskill'svuln-classes.mdreference for your partition's technology. Respect the hard exclusions (DoS, rate limiting, resource exhaustion, open redirects, generic input validation without proven impact) — do not even record them as candidates.
Output
Write candidates INCREMENTALLY to candidates/partition-<k>.json — re-write the
full JSON array after EACH new candidate, so partial results survive if you are
interrupted. Schema per candidate:
{
"id": "p<k>-<n>",
"title": "...",
"category": "injection|authz|authn|crypto|secrets|deserialization|ssrf|path-traversal|xss|other",
"severity": "CRITICAL|HIGH|MEDIUM|LOW|INFO",
"file": "path", "line": 0, "endLine": 0,
"attackScenario": "concrete input → concrete impact",
"dataFlow": ["source file:line", "…", "sink file:line"],
"evidence": "the code excerpt that shows the flaw",
"source": "manual",
"coverage": { "examined": ["..."], "skipped": [{ "path": "...", "reason": "..." }] }
}
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 63 lines · 43 tokens per session scan A 04020b0f1c63
security-finder is an agent published in the GitHub repository ihatesea69/kiro-kit (18 stars, last pushed 17d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 43 tokens to every session and 742 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other agents, from other repositories
atomic-auditor
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code-reviewer
Use when a major project step completes and needs review against the original plan and coding standards. Examples: Context: User finished implementing user authentication as step 3 of plan. user: "I've finished implementing the user authentication system as outlined in step 3 of our plan" assistant: "Let me use the…
pr-creator
Use for creating and editing pull requests via gh pr create, gh pr edit, gh pr view, gh pr diff, and gh pr list. Does NOT merge or mark ready (use pr-merger for that). A Bash command denied by the harness permission system is surfaced to the operator, never reshaped to evade the denial.
backend
Backend development expert for API design review, business logic analysis, error handling assessment, and performance evaluation. Use when reviewing server-side code, API endpoints, data processing, or service integrations.
tdd-guide
Enforces strict RED-GREEN-REFACTOR test-driven development. Use PROACTIVELY when writing new features, fixing bugs, or refactoring code.
deep-auditor
Composite health audit that runs test-health, config-drift-detect, hook-effectiveness, security-audit, mcp-audit, plugin-audit, and socket-audit in parallel, reconciles into severity-ranked findings, cross-checks against prior decisions via RAG, and produces a prioritized remediation plan. Use for "is this project…