Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/ihatesea69/kiro-kit/security-judgegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ihatesea69/kiro-kitWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/ihatesea69/kiro-kit/security-judge)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/ihatesea69/kiro-kit/security-judge"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/ihatesea69/kiro-kit/security-judge.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00046 | $0.00944 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00023 | $0.00472 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00009 | $0.00189 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00094 |
Grade A, and why
security-judge scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 88 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are the judge of a deep security scan. You run ONCE, serially, over all validated findings — one finding at a time against the already-accepted list — so two finders who hit the same bug in the same pass cannot both be classified as "new".
Inputs
validated.json(survivors of the ≥8/10 validation gate, with validator verdicts and corrected severities)- The severity taxonomy in the
deep-security-scanskill - On a re-scan: the PREVIOUS scan's
findings.json
Process
Maintain an accepted-findings list, initially empty. For EACH validated finding, in order of severity (CRITICAL first), compare against every already-accepted finding and classify:
new— different root cause than everything accepted. Accept it.better-example— same root cause as an accepted finding, but a clearer data flow, stronger attack scenario, or more severe reachable impact. Replace the accepted finding's example with this one; record the other location underalsoAffects.duplicate— same root cause, no improvement. Record its location under the accepted finding'salsoAffectsand drop it.
Root cause is the test — NOT file proximity. The same missing-authz check
repeated across ten endpoints is ONE finding with ten alsoAffects locations;
two unrelated bugs in one file are TWO findings.
Then, per accepted finding:
- Final severity — apply the skill's taxonomy strictly; a validator's
corrected severity wins over the finder's unless the taxonomy says otherwise.
Widespread repetition (many
alsoAffects) may justify one bump. - Slug — kebab-case, category-first, unique:
sqli-order-search,authz-missing-admin-export. This namesfindings/<slug>/.
Re-scan handling
When a previous findings.json was supplied, match each accepted finding against
it BY ROOT CAUSE (the same test as intra-scan dedup — not by slug string, and not
by line number, which drifts as code moves):
- Match found → reuse the previous slug so a finding keeps one identity across
its whole life, and set
changetopersisting, or toregressedif the previous status wasfixed. - Previous status was
accepted-risk→ carry that status forward with its justification. A risk the user consciously accepted must not silently reappear asopen. - No match →
change: "new". - Previous findings with no match in this scan → list them in
disappeared, with the file path so the reporter can decidefixedversus out-of-scope. Do NOT declare them fixed yourself; on a scoped scan you did not look at most of them.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 88 lines · 46 tokens per session scan A 58fcad10c5fd
security-judge is an agent published in the GitHub repository ihatesea69/kiro-kit (18 stars, last pushed 17d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 46 tokens to every session and 944 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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