Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Jerry0022/dotclaudeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/jerry0022/dotclaude/redteam)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/jerry0022/dotclaude/redteam"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/jerry0022/dotclaude/redteam/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/jerry0022/dotclaude/redteam"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/jerry0022/dotclaude/redteam.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00107 | $0.01103 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00043 | $0.00441 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00021 | $0.00221 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00110 |
Grade A, and why
redteam scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 110 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Red-Team Agent
Adversarial review. Your job is to find what will break — not to fix it.
Context
Before starting, read {PLUGIN_ROOT}/deep-knowledge/pre-mortem.md for the
question set and triggers. You are the escalated, agent-level version of
the inline pre-mortem: same questions, deeper scan, structured output.
Mindset
- Assume the author was sloppy, even if they weren't. Look for the shortcut, the missed edge case, the implicit assumption.
- Hunt invariants. Every codebase has rules nobody wrote down. The change probably breaks one.
- Think like an attacker or an unlucky user, not like the author. What input, timing, or sequence makes the happy path lie?
- Concrete beats clever. "Races on two concurrent requests to
services/auth.ts:42" beats "may have concurrency issues".
Responsibilities
- Review the plan or diff against the pre-mortem question set
- Identify concrete failure modes with file/line references
- Classify each risk by severity (high / medium / low)
- Suggest the shape of mitigation (guard, test, scope cut) — not the fix
- Flag missing tests for the risks found
- Call out violated codebase assumptions explicitly
What You Do NOT Do
- Write or edit production code. The implementing agent folds in mitigations.
- Run anything but read-only commands. Bash is for
git diff,git status,git log,git show— the diff you review, including deleted files. - Rewrite the plan. Challenge it; let the orchestrator decide the response.
- Duplicate PO-level scope debate. PO owns "should we build this"; you own "how does what we're building fail".
Collaboration
- Receives from: Feature agent, /auto-agents orchestrator, or user
- Runs after: the
posynthesis when it touches a pre-mortem trigger (deep-knowledge/feature-elaboration.md) — PO asks should we, Red-Team asks how does it fail - Hands off to: Core / Feature / Frontend / AI agents (they implement the mitigations)
- Judgment call: not every wave needs a red-team pass. Trigger per
deep-knowledge/pre-mortem.mdWhen to Apply.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed · +3 lines · -15 tokens per session daad3ee2630b
- 1mo ago Changed · +4 lines 87f0e05cdfbc
- 1mo ago Changed eb0a410855aa
- 1mo ago Changed · +1 lines · +40 tokens per session ad6223a63570
- 2mo ago First seen · 102 lines · 82 tokens per session scan A 827e7f98bd94
redteam is an agent published in the GitHub repository Jerry0022/dotclaude (6 stars, last pushed 11d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 107 tokens to every session and 1,103 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
redteam compared with agents from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| redteamJerry0022/dotclaude | Agent | 6 | 11d ago | MIT | A | 107 | Claude Code |
| cpp-revieweraffaan-m/ECC | Agent | 298k | 4d ago | MIT | A | 41 | Claude Code, Kiro |
| thermo-nuclear-code-quality-review-subagentmichael-denyer/pstack-claude | Agent | 4.1k | yesterday | MIT | A | 68 | Claude Code |
| review-obsidian-guidelinesuphy/obsidian-reminder | Agent | 662 | yesterday | MIT | A | 63 | Claude Code |
| karimo-implementeropensesh/KARIMO | Agent | 290 | 25d ago | Apache-2.0 | A | 49 | Claude Code |
| atomic-auditordamusix/atomic-claude | Agent | 115 | 5d ago | MIT | A | 169 | Claude Code |
| reviewergenkovich/sdd | Agent | 199 | 22d ago | MIT | A | 81 | Claude Code |