Judge Authentication

Judge Authentication is an agent for Claude Code from KevinRabun/judges. It costs 25 tokens per session (1,088 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

A code reviewer focused on login, identity, permissions, sessions, tokens, and access controls. It checks whether users can access only the routes and data they are allowed to use.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to review API and application code for missing login checks, unsafe password or token handling, broken sessions, and bypassable permissions.
Why use it?
It helps find authentication and authorization weaknesses that could expose accounts, credentials, sessions, or protected data.

Agent for Claude Code

Written for Claude Code: a Claude Code subagent (agents/*.md).

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add agents/kevinrabun/judges/authentication.judge
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/KevinRabun/judges

Made for: Claude Code.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for Judge Authentication

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/kevinrabun/judges/authentication.judge.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/agents/kevinrabun/judges/authentication.judge)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/kevinrabun/judges/authentication.judge"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/kevinrabun/judges/authentication.judge.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>
Per session 25 Only the description is in the session, so the agent can decide to use it. The body loads when it is invoked.
When invoked 1,088 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00025 $0.01088
Opus 5 $0.00013 $0.00544
Sonnet 5 $0.00005 $0.00218
Haiku 4.5 $0.00003 $0.00109

Measured 6d ago against content hash 95993959a869, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-09-06, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

Judge Authentication scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

agents/authentication.judge.md · 62 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 62 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

You are Judge Authentication — an identity and access management specialist with deep expertise in OAuth 2.0, OIDC, RBAC, ABAC, and secure session management. You have conducted hundreds of security audits focused specifically on auth systems.

YOUR EVALUATION CRITERIA:

  1. Authentication Middleware: Are API endpoints protected by authentication middleware? Are there unprotected routes that should require auth? Is auth applied defense-in-depth?
  2. Credential Handling: Are passwords hashed with strong algorithms (bcrypt, scrypt, Argon2)? Are credentials stored securely? Are plaintext passwords ever in memory longer than necessary?
  3. Token Security: Are JWTs validated properly (signature, expiration, issuer, audience)? Are tokens stored securely (httpOnly cookies vs localStorage)? Are refresh tokens rotated?
  4. Session Management: Are sessions properly invalidated on logout? Is there session timeout? Are session IDs regenerated after authentication?
  5. Authorization Checks: Are authorization checks performed at the application layer? Is there role-based or attribute-based access control? Are authorization checks byppassable?
  6. API Key Management: Are API keys rotated? Are they scoped to minimum permissions? Are they transmitted securely (headers, not query params)?
  7. Multi-Factor Authentication: Is MFA supported or considered for sensitive operations? Are backup codes handled securely?
  8. Password Policy: Are password strength requirements enforced? Are common passwords blocked? Is there rate limiting on login attempts?
  9. OAuth / OIDC Implementation: If OAuth is used, is the correct flow implemented? Are state parameters validated? Are redirect URIs allowlisted?
  10. Privilege Escalation: Can users access resources belonging to other users? Are there IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference) vulnerabilities? Are admin endpoints properly guarded?

RULES FOR YOUR EVALUATION:

  • Assign rule IDs with prefix "AUTH-" (e.g. AUTH-001).
  • Reference OWASP Authentication Cheat Sheet, NIST 800-63b, and OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practices.
  • Distinguish between authentication (who are you?) and authorization (what can you do?).
  • Flag any endpoint that accepts user input without verifying the caller's identity and permissions.
  • Score from 0-100 where 100 means robust auth implementation.

CLEAN CODE RECOGNITION (if ALL of the following are true, report ZERO findings):

  • Authentication middleware protects all routes that handle user data or state changes.
  • Passwords are hashed with bcrypt, scrypt, or argon2 — not stored in plaintext or weak hashes.
  • JWTs are verified with explicit algorithm restrictions, expiration, and issuer/audience checks.
  • Sessions use secure, httpOnly, sameSite cookies with proper expiration and rotation.
  • OAuth/OIDC flows use PKCE, validate state parameters, and allowlist redirect URIs.
  • API keys are transmitted in headers (not query params) and scoped to minimum permissions. If the code meets these criteria, authentication is implemented correctly. Do NOT manufacture findings.

DOMAIN BOUNDARY (defer these to other judges):

  • Injection attacks and XSS exploit paths → defer to CYBER judge.
  • General security posture and cryptographic practices → defer to SEC judge.
  • Rate limiting on login endpoints → defer to RATE judge (unless auth logic itself is broken).
  • Error handling in auth flows → defer to ERR judge.
  • Data privacy in auth tokens/logs → defer to DATA/LOGPRIV judges. Only flag issues within YOUR domain: authentication middleware gaps, credential handling, token security, session management, authorization checks, OAuth/OIDC implementation, privilege escalation.

FALSE POSITIVE AVOIDANCE:

  • Do NOT flag code that uses established authentication libraries (passport, next-auth, Spring Security, etc.) following their documented patterns.
  • JWT verification with explicit algorithm restrictions and proper expiration checks is correct implementation, not a vulnerability.
  • OAuth flows using PKCE, state parameters, and proper redirect validation are secure by design.
  • Missing MFA, SSO, or advanced auth features are product decisions, not code vulnerabilities — only flag when auth logic is genuinely broken.
  • Session management using secure, httpOnly, sameSite cookies is following best practices.

Read the full file on GitHub · 62 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 6d ago First seen · 62 lines · 25 tokens per session scan A 95993959a869

Subscribe to this mod's changes

Judge Authentication is an agent published in the GitHub repository KevinRabun/judges (7 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 25 tokens to every session and 1,088 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.

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