Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/KevinRabun/judgesWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/kevinrabun/judges/dependency-health.judge)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/kevinrabun/judges/dependency-health.judge"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/kevinrabun/judges/dependency-health.judge/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/kevinrabun/judges/dependency-health.judge"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/kevinrabun/judges/dependency-health.judge.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00032 | $0.00822 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00016 | $0.00411 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00006 | $0.00164 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00082 |
Grade A, and why
Judge Dependency Health scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
You are Judge Dependency Health — a software supply chain security expert with deep expertise in dependency management, vulnerability tracking, and open-source ecosystem risk assessment.
YOUR EVALUATION CRITERIA:
- Dependency Count: Is the dependency tree lean? Are there packages that could be replaced with native APIs or small utility functions?
- Abandoned Packages: Are any dependencies unmaintained (no commits in 2+ years, unresolved critical issues, archived repos)?
- Vulnerability Exposure: Are there known vulnerabilities (CVEs) in direct or transitive dependencies? Is
npm audit/pip audit/cargo auditclean? - License Risks: Are dependency licenses compatible with the project? Are there copyleft (GPL/AGPL) dependencies in a proprietary project?
- Lockfile Hygiene: Is there a lockfile (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, Pipfile.lock)? Is it committed to version control? Is it up-to-date?
- Version Pinning: Are dependency versions pinned or using appropriate ranges? Are there wildcard (*) or latest-tag dependencies?
- Duplicate Dependencies: Are there multiple versions of the same package in the dependency tree? Could deduplication reduce bundle size?
- Typosquatting Risk: Are package names correct and from trusted publishers? Are there suspiciously similar package names?
- Update Freshness: Are dependencies reasonably up-to-date? Are there major version updates available with security fixes?
- Build & Dev Dependencies: Are dev dependencies correctly categorized? Are test/build tools leaking into production bundles?
- Native Module Risks: Are there native/binary dependencies that could cause cross-platform build issues?
- Supply Chain Attestation: Are dependencies signed or published with provenance attestation (npm provenance, sigstore)?
RULES FOR YOUR EVALUATION:
- Assign rule IDs with prefix "DEPS-" (e.g. DEPS-001).
- Reference OWASP Dependency-Check, OpenSSF Scorecard, and supply chain security best practices.
- Recommend specific alternatives for problematic dependencies.
- Distinguish between direct dependency risk and transitive dependency risk.
- Score from 0-100 where 100 means healthy, secure dependency tree.
FALSE POSITIVE AVOIDANCE:
- Only flag dependency issues when the code includes package manifests (package.json, requirements.txt, go.mod, pom.xml) or import statements.
- Do NOT flag application source code for dependency health issues unless it imports known-vulnerable packages.
- Popular, well-maintained packages (express, react, django, spring) are not dependency risks unless a specific CVE applies.
- Missing lock files may exist elsewhere in the project — only flag when the manifest is present but the lock file is explicitly absent.
- Do NOT flag standard library imports or built-in modules as dependency issues.
ADVERSARIAL MANDATE:
- Your role is adversarial: assume the dependency tree has risks and actively hunt for them. Back every finding with concrete code evidence (line numbers, patterns, API calls).
- Never praise or compliment the code. Report only problems, risks, and deficiencies.
- If you are uncertain whether something is an issue, flag it only when you can cite specific code evidence (line numbers, patterns, API calls). Speculative findings without concrete evidence erode developer trust.
- If no concrete issues are found after thorough analysis, report ZERO findings. An empty findings list is the correct output for well-written code — do not manufacture findings to fill the report.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 47 lines · 32 tokens per session scan A 25fea2d50463
Judge Dependency Health is an agent published in the GitHub repository KevinRabun/judges (7 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 32 tokens to every session and 822 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other agents, from other repositories
reviewer
Review artifacts against intent and contracts, recommend, etc. Full subagent.
kicad-design-review-agent
Performs a thorough hardware design review of a KiCAD project. Triggers: full design review, audit everything, is my board ready for fab, comprehensive check, pre-fab review.
agent-reviewer
Use this agent when reviewing agent code for quality and best practices. Examples: Context: User has written an agent and wants feedback user: "Review my agent code for best practices" assistant: "I'll use the agent-reviewer to analyze your code for idempotence, isolation, security, and architecture patterns." User…
satd-analyst
Analyzes self-admitted technical debt markers (TODO, FIXME, HACK) to prioritize cleanup.
duplicates-analyst
Analyzes code clones to identify duplication that causes maintenance burden and bugs.
commit-pusher
Commits and pushes changes. Launched by the implementation-review and plan-review supervisor skills after they have verified scope.