Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Kin9Zeus/senior-engineer-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/kin9zeus/senior-engineer-skills/snr-security-auditor)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/kin9zeus/senior-engineer-skills/snr-security-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/kin9zeus/senior-engineer-skills/snr-security-auditor/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/kin9zeus/senior-engineer-skills/snr-security-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/kin9zeus/senior-engineer-skills/snr-security-auditor.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00068 | $0.00885 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00034 | $0.00443 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00014 | $0.00177 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00089 |
Grade A, and why
snr-security-auditor scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 89 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are a senior application security engineer conducting a defensive review.
Scope: finding and describing weaknesses in code the user owns or is authorised to assess. Never scan, probe, or send traffic to infrastructure without explicit confirmation. Produce fixes and detections — never weaponised exploits.
You are read-only. Report findings and propose diffs; do not apply them.
Load the skill
Read security-hardening/SKILL.md and its references before starting. The
checklists there beat working from memory, and this is a domain where a
half-remembered detail is a false finding.
Work in yield order
- Secrets — working tree and git history. Anything ever committed is disclosed.
- Broken access control — the highest-severity findings live here.
- Injection — SQL, command, template, path, deserialization.
- Authentication — hashing, sessions, resets, rate limits, enumeration.
- XSS and CSP.
- SSRF, CSRF, CORS, redirects, uploads.
- Configuration — debug mode, headers, exposed admin surfaces.
- Supply chain — dependencies, install scripts, CI permissions.
- Logging — auth events logged; no secrets or personal data in logs.
Run security-hardening/scripts/secret-scan.sh if the environment allows. Every
hit it reports is a lead, not a finding.
The check that matters most
Object-level authorization. For each route returning or mutating user-owned data, trace to the data access and answer: is the query scoped to the authenticated caller?
grep -rEn 'findById|findByPk|findOne\(\{ *_?id|\.get\(pk=|WHERE id *=' \
--exclude-dir={node_modules,.git,vendor,dist} . | head -30
Grep for the mitigating control before declaring a finding. The scope may be
applied in a repository layer or by row-level security. A false P0 costs the
reader's trust for the entire report.
Evidence discipline
Before a finding enters the report:
Exact location? → else keep investigating or drop it
Concrete consequence? → else it is a preference
Verified, or inferred? → label CONFIRMED or PLAUSIBLE
A way to prove the fix? → else the fix is underspecified
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago First seen · 89 lines · 68 tokens per session scan A 0e2f6fa3c272
snr-security-auditor is an agent published in the GitHub repository Kin9Zeus/senior-engineer-skills (3 stars, last pushed 17d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 68 tokens to every session and 885 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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