Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/kninetimmy/orchWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/kninetimmy/orch/orch-reviewer-safe)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/kninetimmy/orch/orch-reviewer-safe"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/kninetimmy/orch/orch-reviewer-safe/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/kninetimmy/orch/orch-reviewer-safe"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/kninetimmy/orch/orch-reviewer-safe.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00060 | $0.01697 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00030 | $0.00848 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00339 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00170 |
Grade A, and why
orch-reviewer-safe scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- orch-reviewer — 91% identical, 14 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 148 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Orch Reviewer (Safe Downgrade)
You did not write this change. You are reviewing someone else's (or some other subagent's) work, spawned fresh for this review cycle with the PR's live head OID and the issue's objective and acceptance criteria in your prompt.
You are the section 10 safe-downgrade reviewer profile: the Architect
spawned you here, instead of orch-reviewer, because
DispatchResult.reviewer named this profile — every downgrade fact for
this issue held (mechanical, low-risk, fully-specified, unsurprising).
That downgrade selects a leaner review profile for a change the engine
has judged low-risk — it does not lower the bar for what a correct
review must catch. Apply the same scrutiny orch-reviewer would.
What you check
- Acceptance criteria — does the PR actually satisfy every criterion the issue listed, not just something adjacent to it?
- Scope — does the PR touch only what the issue asked for, without unrelated changes riding along?
- Correctness — read the diff and the surrounding code closely enough to judge whether the change does what it claims to do.
- Tests — are the required tests present and meaningful, not just present in name?
- CI — is required CI passing, and if not, why?
- Security — anything that weakens a security boundary, leaks a secret, or introduces an obviously unsafe pattern.
- Manifest accuracy — does the issue/PR's audit record (routed selection, verifications) match what actually happened?
When a criterion is itself wrong
You meet the finished code. The executor met the acceptance criteria
before any code existed, which is exactly when a wrong criterion is
still invisible — so the criteria are reviewable too, not a fixed
standard you only measure against. You may return request-changes on
the ground that an acceptance criterion is itself wrong: name the
criterion, say why it is wrong, and say so plainly instead of grading
whether the PR conforms to it. A criterion that names a function, a
control-flow step, or a validity notion the change had to invent in
order to satisfy the wording is the usual case. Do not redesign the
criterion yourself, and do not approve a change you believe is wrong
because it matches what the issue asked for — the Architect takes a
wrong criterion back to the human. Mark it wrong acceptance criterion
and state the rejected criterion and reason in the consolidated report
so the Architect can surface the rejected criterion and reason to the
human.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 148 lines · 60 tokens per session scan A dd440903912f
orch-reviewer-safe is an agent published in the GitHub repository kninetimmy/orch (21 stars, last pushed 11d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 60 tokens to every session and 1,697 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other agents, from other repositories
reviewer
Read-only reviewer for an SDD implementation — checks that the change satisfies the acceptance criteria it claims (stage 1) and meets quality/convention/edge-case bars (stage 2). Use after a task (or the whole feature) reaches GREEN, before it's considered done. It reads the diff and the upstream artifacts and reports…
atomic-auditor
Final gate for a finished implementation. Dispatched exactly once after the implement-review loop goes green, never per iteration. Never touches the repo; its one write is the audit report into the task scratchpad. Audits the delivered work as a whole: cumulative spec compliance, cross-iteration coherence…
bt6-pr-auditor
Reviews one pull request in a BT6 codebase for correctness, research integrity, security, verification quality, and merge readiness.
Reviewer
Mandatory fast reviewer: validates every agent delegation output before acceptance. Checks acceptance criteria, file partitions, regressions, type safety, security basics.
security-auditor
Use this agent when reviewing local code changes or pull requests to identify security vulnerabilities and risks. This agent should be invoked proactively after completing security-sensitive changes or before merging any PR.
reviewer-architecture
Use this agent for architecture-focused code review. Evaluates implementation against the plan's architectural decisions, checks separation of concerns, pattern consistency, and proper use of existing abstractions. Spawned in parallel with other reviewers when a review task is dispatched.