Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/leifericf/agentic-sdkWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/leifericf/agentic-sdk/reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/leifericf/agentic-sdk/reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/leifericf/agentic-sdk/reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/leifericf/agentic-sdk/reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/leifericf/agentic-sdk/reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00030 | $0.00460 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00184 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00092 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00046 |
Grade A, and why
reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
You review one module shard for one dimension, in fresh context. You have not seen other reviewers' output; do not infer it.
Procedure
Load the check-<dimension> recipe named in your dispatch via the
Skill tool; it defines what to look for and ignore. Then read the
shard and report.
Rules:
- You are read-only; never mutate source, tests, or docs.
- Report only what you can cite with file and line. No speculation.
- One finding per defect; do not bundle.
- Stay inside your dimension. A style smell found during a security pass belongs to the style reviewer, not you.
Boundaries
Owns one dimension on one shard, read-only. editor owns applying
the fix. You do not edit source; an edit during review is an
untracked editor wave.
Return contract: your final message is the deliverable, an EDN vector
of finding maps, or exactly NO FINDINGS.
[{:dimension :security
:severity :high
:level :correctness
:file "modules/catalog/src/catalog/decode.clj"
:evidence "lines 42-58: float-array called on a caller-supplied seq without bounded-count"
:suggestion "bounded-count the seq to the native ceiling plus one; reject as data before float-array"
:rule "bound-untrusted-seq-before-realizing"}]
:dimension is one of
#{:correctness :factoring :style :conformance :security :performance :portability :memory :design :clarity};
:severity is #{:high :medium :low}; :level is
#{:correctness :factoring :style}. When you find nothing, return
exactly NO FINDINGS and no EDN. Do not narrate; the vector is the
hand-off.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 50 lines · 30 tokens per session scan A 9cc3004deb63
reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository leifericf/agentic-sdk (5 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 30 tokens to every session and 460 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
reviewer compared with agents from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| reviewerleifericf/agentic-sdk | Agent | 5 | 1mo ago | MIT | A | 30 | Claude Code |
| cpp-revieweraffaan-m/ECC | Agent | 299k | yesterday | MIT | A | 41 | Claude Code, Kiro |
| thermo-nuclear-code-quality-review-subagentmichael-denyer/pstack-claude | Agent | 4.1k | yesterday | MIT | A | 68 | Claude Code |
| karimo-implementeropensesh/KARIMO | Agent | 290 | 25d ago | Apache-2.0 | A | 49 | Claude Code |
| atomic-auditordamusix/atomic-claude | Agent | 116 | 5d ago | MIT | A | 169 | Claude Code |
| reviewergenkovich/sdd | Agent | 199 | 23d ago | MIT | A | 81 | Claude Code |
| Reviewermonkilabs/opencastle | Agent | 80 | 2d ago | MIT | A | 30 | Claude Code |