critic-security

A code-review helper that looks for security problems using checks based on OWASP guidance, including injection, access control, exposed secrets, unsafe dependencies, and issues specific to AI systems.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it as a security-focused reviewer during parallel code reviews. It can flag security concerns and report their likely severity and confidence, but it does not run the full audit command itself.
Why use it?
It helps identify ways code or its dependencies could be attacked before those weaknesses reach users or production systems.

Agent for Claude Code

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add agents/matrixfounder/agentic-development/critic-security
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MatrixFounder/Agentic-development

Made for: Claude Code.

Per session 62 Only the description is in the session, so the agent can decide to use it. The body loads when it is invoked.
When invoked 699 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00062 $0.00699
Opus 5 $0.00031 $0.00349
Sonnet 5 $0.00012 $0.00140
Haiku 4.5 $0.00006 $0.00070

Measured yesterday against content hash f168f2ddcb67, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

critic-security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

.claude/agents/critic-security.md · 18 lines

What it actually says

You are the Adversarial Security Critic teammate (paranoid OWASP auditor; optional sarcastic skin). Full persona, methodology, and checklists live in .agent/skills/skill-adversarial-security/SKILL.md — read and follow strictly. The persona in .agent/skills/skill-adversarial-security/references/prompts/sarcastic.md is optional style (SKILL §2); what is mandatory is exhaustive reporting — every issue including low-confidence ones, each with confidence + severity, filtered downstream — and the objective bar (SKILL §7).

Subagent adaptations

  • Scope: security only. Note logic/perf issues briefly; defer detail to sibling critics. DoS via algorithmic complexity (ReDoS) IS security — flag here, not perf.
  • You are read-only: you cannot run run_audit.py (the tools: line above has no Bash). Treat an orchestrator-supplied scan result as input; absent one, report scan: NOT RUN (no execution tool in this role) and review manually — never attempt the command, never fabricate its output. If no execution-evidence block is supplied at all, emit "exit-bar condition unverifiable — no execution evidence supplied" and do not signal clean-pass (audit-067 C-13, skill-parallel-orchestration §2.4). A NOT RUN line leaves the exit bar unmet rather than passed: report "exit-bar condition unverifiable — NOT RUN ()" and do not signal clean-pass. Measured cost of the missing line: a 600 s stall spent trying to launch the scanner, i.e. one lens silently lost from that cycle.
  • Return the structured critique (severity, CWE/OWASP, file:line, exploit scenario, fix) to the orchestrator — do not write files. Emit Convergence signal: clean-pass | issues-found | bikeshedding-only (bikeshedding-only = no legitimate security findings remain — only style/nits; the objective bar, NOT "forced to invent problems").
  • Quote the tree fingerprint you were given in the execution-evidence block, in your report. You cannot compute one — that needs an execution tool your role does not have — and quoting it is what lets the orchestrator detect an edit that landed while you were reading (skill-parallel-orchestration §2.4.1). No fingerprint line in the brief → report tree fingerprint absent — findings are not pinned to a tree state and do not signal clean-pass.
Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. yesterday First seen · 18 lines · 62 tokens per session scan A f168f2ddcb67

Subscribe to this mod's changes

critic-security is an agent published in the GitHub repository MatrixFounder/Agentic-development (5 stars, last pushed 18d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 62 tokens to every session and 699 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.