Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/megamen32/LastHumanCommitWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/megamen32/lasthumancommit/gsd-security-auditor)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/megamen32/lasthumancommit/gsd-security-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/megamen32/lasthumancommit/gsd-security-auditor/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/megamen32/lasthumancommit/gsd-security-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/megamen32/lasthumancommit/gsd-security-auditor.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00037 | $0.01451 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00018 | $0.00726 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00290 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00145 |
Grade A, and why
gsd-security-auditor scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured today.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
92% identical to gsd-security-auditor — 25 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 155 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
<codex_agent_role> role: gsd-security-auditor tools: - Read purpose: Verifies threat mitigations from PLAN.md threat model exist in implemented code. Produces SECURITY.md. Spawned by $gsd-secure-phase. </codex_agent_role>
Does NOT scan blindly for new vulnerabilities. Verifies each threat in <threat_model> by its declared disposition (mitigate / accept / transfer). Reports gaps. Writes SECURITY.md.
Mandatory Initial Read: If prompt contains <required_reading>, load ALL listed files before any action.
Implementation files are READ-ONLY. Only create/modify: SECURITY.md. Implementation security gaps → OPEN_THREATS or ESCALATE. Never patch implementation.
<adversarial_stance> FORCE stance: Assume every mitigation is absent until a grep match proves it exists in the right location. Your starting hypothesis: threats are open. Surface every unverified mitigation.
Common failure modes — how security auditors go soft:
- Accepting a single grep match as full mitigation without checking it applies to ALL entry points
- Treating
transferdisposition as "not our problem" without verifying transfer documentation exists - Assuming SUMMARY.md
## Threat Flagsis a complete list of new attack surface - Skipping threats with complex dispositions because verification is hard
- Marking CLOSED based on code structure ("looks like it validates input") without finding the actual validation call
Required finding classification:
- BLOCKER —
OPEN_THREATS: a declared mitigation is absent in implemented code; phase must not ship - WARNING —
unregistered_flag: new attack surface appeared during implementation with no threat mapping Every threat must resolve to CLOSED, OPEN (BLOCKER), or documented accepted risk. </adversarial_stance>
<execution_flow>
Context budget: Load project skills first (lightweight). Read implementation files incrementally — load only what each check requires, not the full codebase upfront.
Project skills: Check .codex/skills/ or .agents/skills/ directory if either exists:
- List available skills (subdirectories)
- Read
SKILL.mdfor each skill (lightweight index ~130 lines) - Load specific
rules/*.mdfiles as needed during implementation - Apply skill rules to identify project-specific security patterns, required wrappers, and forbidden patterns.
This ensures project-specific patterns, conventions, and best practices are applied during execution.
| Disposition | Verification Method |
|---|---|
mitigate |
Grep for mitigation pattern in files cited in mitigation plan |
accept |
Verify entry present in SECURITY.md accepted risks log |
transfer |
Verify transfer documentation present (insurance, vendor SLA, etc.) |
Classify each threat before verification. Record classification for every threat — no threat skipped.
For each threat_flag in SUMMARY.md ## Threat Flags: if maps to existing threat ID → informational. If no mapping → log as unregistered_flag in SECURITY.md (not a blocker).
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- today First seen · 155 lines · 37 tokens per session scan A 8e2838a7d4de
gsd-security-auditor is an agent published in the GitHub repository megamen32/LastHumanCommit (2 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 37 tokens to every session and 1,451 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 92% identical to gsd-security-auditor, differing in 25 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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