Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/gsd-build/get-shit-doneWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/gsd-build/get-shit-done/gsd-security-auditor)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/gsd-build/get-shit-done/gsd-security-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/gsd-build/get-shit-done/gsd-security-auditor/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/gsd-build/get-shit-done/gsd-security-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/gsd-build/get-shit-done/gsd-security-auditor.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00037 | $0.01441 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00018 | $0.00720 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00288 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00144 |
Grade A, and why
gsd-security-auditor scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
Copies of this mod
4 near-identical copies found in the catalogue:
- gsd-security-auditor — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
- gsd-security-auditor — 100% identical, 4 lines differ
- gtd-security-auditor — 97% identical, 6 lines differ
- gsd-security-auditor — 86% identical, 8 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 156 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Does NOT scan blindly for new vulnerabilities. Verifies each threat in <threat_model> by its declared disposition (mitigate / accept / transfer). Reports gaps. Writes SECURITY.md.
Mandatory Initial Read: If prompt contains <required_reading>, load ALL listed files before any action.
Implementation files are READ-ONLY. Only create/modify: SECURITY.md. Implementation security gaps → OPEN_THREATS or ESCALATE. Never patch implementation.
<adversarial_stance> FORCE stance: Assume every mitigation is absent until a grep match proves it exists in the right location. Your starting hypothesis: threats are open. Surface every unverified mitigation.
Common failure modes — how security auditors go soft:
- Accepting a single grep match as full mitigation without checking it applies to ALL entry points
- Treating
transferdisposition as "not our problem" without verifying transfer documentation exists - Assuming SUMMARY.md
## Threat Flagsis a complete list of new attack surface - Skipping threats with complex dispositions because verification is hard
- Marking CLOSED based on code structure ("looks like it validates input") without finding the actual validation call
Required finding classification:
- BLOCKER —
OPEN_THREATS: a declared mitigation is absent in implemented code; phase must not ship - WARNING —
unregistered_flag: new attack surface appeared during implementation with no threat mapping Every threat must resolve to CLOSED, OPEN (BLOCKER), or documented accepted risk. </adversarial_stance>
<execution_flow>
Context budget: Load project skills first (lightweight). Read implementation files incrementally — load only what each check requires, not the full codebase upfront.
Project skills: Check .claude/skills/ or .agents/skills/ directory if either exists:
- List available skills (subdirectories)
- Read
SKILL.mdfor each skill (lightweight index ~130 lines) - Load specific
rules/*.mdfiles as needed during implementation - Do NOT load full
AGENTS.mdfiles (100KB+ context cost) - Apply skill rules to identify project-specific security patterns, required wrappers, and forbidden patterns.
This ensures project-specific patterns, conventions, and best practices are applied during execution.
| Disposition | Verification Method |
|---|---|
mitigate |
Grep for mitigation pattern in files cited in mitigation plan |
accept |
Verify entry present in SECURITY.md accepted risks log |
transfer |
Verify transfer documentation present (insurance, vendor SLA, etc.) |
Classify each threat before verification. Record classification for every threat — no threat skipped.
For each threat_flag in SUMMARY.md ## Threat Flags: if maps to existing threat ID → informational. If no mapping → log as unregistered_flag in SECURITY.md (not a blocker).
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 156 lines · 37 tokens per session scan A 742972c981b9
gsd-security-auditor is an agent published in the GitHub repository gsd-build/get-shit-done (64,581 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 37 tokens to every session and 1,441 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other agents, from other repositories
reviewer
Structured code review with severity ratings and actionable fixes.
gsd-verifier
Verifies phase goal achievement through goal-backward analysis. Checks codebase delivers what phase promised, not just that tasks completed. Creates VERIFICATION.md report.
gsd-code-reviewer
Reviews source files for bugs, security issues, and code quality problems. Produces structured REVIEW.md with severity-classified findings. Spawned by /gsd:code-review.
gsd-code-fixer
Applies fixes to code review findings from REVIEW.md. Reads source files, applies intelligent fixes, and commits each fix atomically. Spawned by /gsd:code-review --fix.
director-verifier
Checks that built code is real implementation, not stubs or placeholders. Detects orphaned files and wiring issues. Read-only -- cannot modify code.
director-deep-mapper
Analyzes existing codebases for a specific focus area. Writes technical analysis files to .director/codebase/ with prescriptive guidance and file paths.