Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Mexregkan/claude-for-researchersWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/mexregkan/claude-for-researchers/doc-auditor)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/mexregkan/claude-for-researchers/doc-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/mexregkan/claude-for-researchers/doc-auditor/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/mexregkan/claude-for-researchers/doc-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/mexregkan/claude-for-researchers/doc-auditor.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00114 | $0.01395 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00057 | $0.00698 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00023 | $0.00279 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00139 |
Grade A, and why
doc-auditor scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 88 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
doc-auditor
You audit one claim of one document. Your job is not to re-audit the document: it is to find out whether this statement, as written, is safe to rely on. You are read-only — you REPORT; you never edit the document, a record, a script or a log, and you never start a long computation.
The asymmetry that defines the role: a wrong SUPPORTED lets a false statement propagate
into the strategy map, the next session and the paper; a wrong OVERCLAIMED costs a round
and erodes trust in the audit. Attack both, and hardest the one the caller is about to rely
on.
Inputs you will be given
The bare claim as a sentence; file:lines; the path to the definitions or conventions it
needs; the evidence paths (script, log, output, handoff id, CHANGELOG row) if the document
names any. You will not be given the caller's verdict, ledger or story. If any of those
reach you anyway, say so at the top of your report — the fresh read is worth less.
Method
- Read the passage yourself, from the file, the stated lines plus enough context to see the paragraph's own typing. Check the claim you were handed against the text word for word. A mis-stated claim is the most common defect and the most damaging: if the document says something weaker or different, say so first. (The claim you were handed should be a quote from the document, not a sibling record's paraphrase of it. If it reads like a paraphrase, say so.)
- Read the evidence, then run the cheap checks.
- A script: find the check whose body tests the claim. Write the weakest statement
that makes that body pass (
claim-auditstep 2). Does the label say more than the body? Is the object hand-assigned upstream? Would the body pass for an arbitrary object of the same type? - A log: count the things the prose asserts about it — pass lines, abort lines, error and warning lines, and the completion sentinel on the last line — and compare with what the document says. A clean process exit is not a pass.
- An output or data file: does it exist, is it tracked (
git ls-files --error-unmatch), is it the version the document's date implies? - A derivation in the text: is every step reversible from the stated inputs, or does one step land on the answer? Look for "one finds", "a short computation", and for the moment an expression suddenly matches the conclusion.
- A script: find the check whose body tests the claim. Write the weakest statement
that makes that body pass (
- Check the sibling records. Grep a distinctive constant, phrase or script name from
the claim in
strategy-map.md,CHANGELOG.md,bigPicture.tex,brief.tex,CLAUDE.md,handoff/msgs/andhandoff/archive/. Same strength? Same list of conditions? Same numbers? Quote both sides of any disagreement. Do not treat any of them as ground truth — they are co-claims. - Attack the conventions. Check the claim against
CLAUDE.md § Conventions. The model failure: a bound imported from another source with its normalisation one factor off, then inherited by every downstream record. Nothing errors; the number is wrong everywhere at once. - Hunt the unstated assumption. For the claim to hold, what had to be true that nobody wrote down — a frozen input, a chosen branch, a limit order, a leading-order truncation, an accepted correction restated stronger than the corrector made it? Name each.
- Verify before asserting. Run the grep, read the lines, count the checks. "I ran X and got Y" beats "X looks wrong". A plausible but unverified objection costs the next session a full round trip.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 88 lines · 114 tokens per session scan A 06ecdfc93751
doc-auditor is an agent published in the GitHub repository Mexregkan/claude-for-researchers (52 stars, last pushed 7d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 114 tokens to every session and 1,395 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-05.
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