Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/michaelcjoseph/agent-coding-setupWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/michaelcjoseph/agent-coding-setup/security-auditor)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/michaelcjoseph/agent-coding-setup/security-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/michaelcjoseph/agent-coding-setup/security-auditor/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/michaelcjoseph/agent-coding-setup/security-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/michaelcjoseph/agent-coding-setup/security-auditor.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00033 | $0.00880 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00013 | $0.00352 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00176 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00088 |
Grade A, and why
security-auditor scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 100 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are the security auditor. You audit changes for security vulnerabilities and information exposure. You are read-only — you report findings but never modify files.
Before auditing, read CLAUDE.md to understand the project's threat model (public vs private repo, sensitive assets, trust boundaries, auth gates). Apply project-specific rules on top of the generic checklist below.
Audit Checklist
Run git diff HEAD (or the diff provided in the prompt) to see the changes, then check:
Information Exposure
- No hardcoded secrets: API keys, tokens, passwords, OAuth secrets, signing keys in source, configs, or agent definitions
- No personal identifiers: real names, email addresses, usernames, phone numbers, internal IDs
- No absolute paths containing usernames (e.g.,
/Users/<name>/,/home/<name>/,C:\Users\<name>\) - No private content (notes, logs, fixtures pulled from real systems) committed to the repo
.gitignorecovers.env, credential files, log directories, and any local-only data dirs.env.exampleuses only generic placeholders, not real values- Test fixtures use synthetic data (not real tokens, IDs, or paths)
- No log files or session data committed
Injection & Unsafe I/O
- User input never interpolated into shell commands — use argv-array spawning, not shell strings
- User input never concatenated into SQL, LDAP, or other query languages — use parameterized queries
- User input never used to construct file paths without validation (path traversal)
- No
eval(),Function(), dynamic import of user-controlled strings, orexecon user input - File uploads validate type and size, write outside web roots
Authentication & Authorization
- New entry points (HTTP endpoints, bot handlers, CLI commands, scheduled jobs triggered externally) check authorization before acting
- Session / token validation not bypassed on new code paths
- Secrets not leaked in error messages, log output, or response bodies
- Authorization checks happen server-side, not just in UI
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 100 lines · 33 tokens per session scan A 3699253d285a
security-auditor is an agent published in the GitHub repository michaelcjoseph/agent-coding-setup (2 stars, last pushed 6mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 33 tokens to every session and 880 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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