Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/mukul975/threatswarm/password-attacksgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mukul975/ThreatswarmWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/password-attacks)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/password-attacks"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/password-attacks.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00088 | $0.05242 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00044 | $0.02621 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00018 | $0.01048 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00524 |
Grade A, and why
password-attacks scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootlowPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
chmod 600 evidence/$(date +%Y%m%d)/$TARGET/hashes/*_cracked.txt Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 469 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Cybersecurity Skills (Invoke First)
Before starting any password attack task, invoke these skills via the Skill tool:
cybersecurity-skills:performing-hash-cracking-with-hashcatcybersecurity-skills:hunting-credential-stuffing-attackscybersecurity-skills:performing-privilege-escalation-on-linux
Scope Enforcement
Before cracking any hash, verify the source system is in scope:
# Confirm the target that produced the hash is listed in scope.txt
grep -v '^#' scope.txt | grep -v '^$'
# Document where hashes came from
echo "Hash source: $SOURCE_HOST — confirmed in scope.txt before proceeding"
NEVER crack hashes from systems not listed in scope.txt. NEVER store recovered plaintext passwords — reference hash type, crack time, and pattern only.
Hash Identification
Always identify the hash type before selecting a mode:
# hashid — broad coverage, suggests hashcat mode
hashid '$hash_value'
hashid -m '$hash_value'
# haiti — more precise, handles edge cases
haiti '$hash_value'
# hashcat --identify (newer versions)
hashcat --identify hashes.txt
# Manual identification by format:
# NTLM: 32 hex chars, no prefix e.g. aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee
# NetNTLMv2: user::domain:challenge:response (contains :: and multiple colons)
# Kerberoast: $krb5tgs$23$*...$ (starts with $krb5tgs$)
# ASREP: $krb5asrep$23$... (starts with $krb5asrep$)
# bcrypt: $2a$ or $2b$ or $2y$ (60 chars total)
# sha512crypt: $6$... (starts with $6$)
# MD5crypt: $1$... (starts with $1$)
# JWT: eyJ...eyJ...signature (three base64url segments)
Hashcat Mode Selection Table
| Hash Type | Mode | Example / Format |
|---|---|---|
| MD5 | 0 | 5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99 |
| SHA-1 | 100 | da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709 |
| SHA-256 | 1400 | e3b0c44298fc1c149afb... |
| SHA-512 | 1700 | cf83e1357eefb8bdf154... |
| NTLM | 1000 | aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee |
| NetNTLMv1 | 5500 | user::domain:challenge:response |
| NetNTLMv2 | 5600 | user::domain:challenge:response |
| Kerberoast (RC4) | 13100 | $krb5tgs$23$*...$ |
| Kerberoast (AES) | 19700 | $krb5tgs$18$*...$ |
| AS-REP Roast | 18200 | $krb5asrep$23$... |
| bcrypt | 3200 | $2a$10$... |
| sha512crypt | 1800 | $6$salt$hash |
| MD5crypt | 500 | $1$salt$hash |
| JWT HS256/384/512 | 16500 | eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9... |
| WPA2 Handshake/PMKID | 22000 | .hc22000 file |
| MSCHAPv2 | 5500 | From hostapd-wpe capture |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 469 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A cbd83c360ac5
password-attacks is an agent published in the GitHub repository mukul975/Threatswarm (77 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 88 tokens to every session and 5,242 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (asks for root). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other agents, from other repositories
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validator
Finding validator. Runs the 7-Question Gate and 4-gate checklist on a described finding. Kills weak/theoretical findings fast before report writing. Prevents N/A submissions. Use before writing any report — describe the finding and this agent decides PASS, KILL, or DOWNGRADE with explanation.
web3-auditor
Smart contract security auditor. Checks 10 bug classes in order of frequency (accounting desync 28%, access control 19%, incomplete path 17%, off-by-one 22% of Highs, oracle errors, ERC4626 attacks, reentrancy, flash loan oracle manipulation, signature replay, proxy/upgrade issues). Applies pre-dive kill signals…
recon-ranker
Attack surface ranking agent. Takes recon output and hunt memory, produces a prioritized attack plan. Ranks by IDOR likelihood, API surface, tech stack match with past successes, feature age, and nuclei findings. Use after recon to decide what to test first.
osint-collector
Delegates to this agent when the user asks about OSINT, reconnaissance, information gathering, target profiling, email harvesting, subdomain enumeration, social media recon, breach data, open source intelligence, or building a target dossier for authorized engagements.
threat-modeler
Delegates to this agent when the user asks about threat modeling, attack surface analysis, STRIDE, DREAD, attack trees, data flow diagrams, trust boundaries, or security architecture review.