Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mukul975/ThreatswarmWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/report-writer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/report-writer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/report-writer.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00071 | $0.02307 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00036 | $0.01154 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00014 | $0.00461 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00231 |
Grade A, and why
report-writer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 286 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Cybersecurity Skills (Invoke First)
Before writing any report, invoke these skills via the Skill tool:
cybersecurity-skills:generating-threat-intelligence-reportscybersecurity-skills:building-incident-response-playbookcybersecurity-skills:building-incident-response-dashboardcybersecurity-skills:building-soc-playbook-for-ransomwarecybersecurity-skills:implementing-diamond-model-analysis
Scope Enforcement
Read evidence/ directories only. Never include plaintext credentials in reports. Verify scope.txt matches what was tested before writing scope section. All credential references must use [REDACTED] in the report.
Evidence Collection
# Gather all findings files from evidence directory
echo "=== Evidence Inventory ===" | tee reports/evidence_inventory.txt
# Find all findings files
find evidence/ -name "*findings*" -o -name "*report*" -o -name "*.md" \
2>/dev/null | sort | tee -a reports/evidence_inventory.txt
# Count findings by severity
echo "" | tee -a reports/evidence_inventory.txt
echo "=== Finding Counts ===" | tee -a reports/evidence_inventory.txt
for sev in CRITICAL HIGH MEDIUM LOW INFO; do
count=$(grep -rh "$sev" evidence/**/*findings*.md 2>/dev/null | wc -l)
echo "$sev: $count" | tee -a reports/evidence_inventory.txt
done
# Collect dates tested
echo "" | tee -a reports/evidence_inventory.txt
echo "=== Test Dates ===" | tee -a reports/evidence_inventory.txt
ls -la evidence/ 2>/dev/null | grep "^d" | awk '{print $9}' | \
tee -a reports/evidence_inventory.txt
Report Template Structure
The report-writer agent reads all evidence files and produces a professional pentest report. Below is the complete template:
Full Report Template
---
# PENETRATION TEST REPORT
## $ENGAGEMENT_NAME
### $TARGET_ORGANIZATION
---
**Classification**: CONFIDENTIAL — FOR AUTHORIZED RECIPIENTS ONLY
**Report Date**: $(date +%Y-%m-%d)
**Testing Period**: [START DATE] — [END DATE]
**Report Version**: 1.0
---
## Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary
2. Scope and Methodology
3. Risk Rating Criteria
4. Executive Findings Summary
5. Detailed Findings
6. Remediation Roadmap
7. Appendices
---
# 1. Executive Summary
## Risk Posture
[2-3 paragraph summary of overall security posture, business impact, and top 3 most critical issues]
**Overall Risk Rating**: [CRITICAL/HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW]
## Key Findings Overview
| Severity | Count | Examples |
|----------|-------|---------|
| Critical | X | [e.g., RCE on perimeter web app] |
| High | X | [e.g., SQL injection, privilege escalation] |
| Medium | X | [e.g., outdated TLS, missing headers] |
| Low | X | [e.g., verbose error messages] |
| Informational | X | [e.g., asset discovery, technology stack] |
## Top 3 Business-Critical Findings
1. **[CRITICAL] [Finding Title]**: [1-2 sentences on business impact and urgency]
2. **[HIGH] [Finding Title]**: [1-2 sentences on business impact and urgency]
3. **[HIGH] [Finding Title]**: [1-2 sentences on business impact and urgency]
---
# 2. Scope and Methodology
## Scope
| Asset | Type | Testing Period | Notes |
|-------|------|----------------|-------|
[from scope.txt]
## Engagement Type
- [ ] Black Box (no prior knowledge)
- [x] Grey Box (limited documentation provided)
- [ ] White Box (full access to source code and documentation)
## Methodology
This assessment followed industry-standard penetration testing methodology:
1. **Reconnaissance**: Passive OSINT, active scanning (nmap, nuclei, subfinder)
2. **Enumeration**: Service fingerprinting, web directory discovery, API enumeration
3. **Exploitation**: Vulnerability verification and controlled exploitation
4. **Post-Exploitation**: Privilege escalation, lateral movement (if in scope)
5. **Reporting**: Evidence collection, CVSS scoring, remediation guidance
## Tools Used
| Tool | Purpose | Version |
|------|---------|---------|
| nmap | Port scanning and service fingerprinting | [version] |
| nuclei | Vulnerability scanning | [version] |
| Metasploit | Exploitation framework | [version] |
| Burp Suite | Web application testing | [version] |
| impacket | Active Directory attacks | [version] |
| hashcat | Password cracking | [version] |
| [others] | | |
---
# 3. Risk Rating Criteria
## CVSS 3.1 Severity Mapping
| CVSS Score | Severity | SLA |
|------------|----------|-----|
| 9.0 – 10.0 | Critical | 24 hours |
| 7.0 – 8.9 | High | 7 days |
| 4.0 – 6.9 | Medium | 30 days |
| 0.1 – 3.9 | Low | 90 days |
| 0.0 | Informational | Next release |
## Risk Matrix
│ LOW MEDIUM HIGH CRITICAL
────────┼───────────────────────────────── HIGH │ MEDIUM HIGH CRITICAL CRITICAL MEDIUM │ LOW MEDIUM HIGH CRITICAL LOW │ INFO LOW MEDIUM HIGH │ [impact →] [likelihood ↑]
---
# 4. Executive Findings Summary
| ID | Title | Severity | CVSS | Component | Status |
|----|-------|----------|------|-----------|--------|
| F-01 | [Finding] | CRITICAL | X.X | [URL/Host] | Open |
| F-02 | [Finding] | HIGH | X.X | | Open |
[continue for all findings]
---
# 5. Detailed Findings
## F-01 — [SEVERITY] Finding Title
**CVSS 3.1 Score**: X.X ([SEVERITY])
**CVSS Vector**: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`
**CWE**: CWE-XXX: [Name]
**ATT&CK TTP**: [T1234 — Technique Name]
**Affected Component**: [URL / IP:PORT / Service Version]
### Description
[2-4 sentences describing the vulnerability, how it was identified, and its technical nature]
### Business Impact
[2-3 sentences describing what an attacker could do with this vulnerability and the business consequence — data breach, service disruption, regulatory penalty, reputational damage, etc.]
### Steps to Reproduce
1. Navigate to [URL] or connect to [HOST:PORT]
2. [Step 2 — specific request/payload]
3. [Step 3 — observe result]
**Evidence**: `evidence/[DATE]/[TARGET]/[path/to/screenshot.png]`
**Request**:
\`\`\`http
GET /vulnerable/endpoint HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
[headers]
[payload]
\`\`\`
**Response** (truncated, sensitive values [REDACTED]):
\`\`\`
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
[relevant response lines]
\`\`\`
### Remediation
[Specific, actionable remediation steps]
1. **Immediate**: [Emergency mitigation if critical]
2. **Short-term**: [Patch or code fix]
3. **Long-term**: [Architectural improvement]
**References**:
- [Vendor advisory URL]
- [CVE-XXXX-XXXX](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-XXXX-XXXX)
- [OWASP guidance URL]
---
[Repeat for each finding]
---
# 6. Remediation Roadmap
## 30-Day Priority (Critical & High)
| Finding | Owner | Effort | Deadline |
|---------|-------|--------|----------|
## 60-Day Priority (Medium)
| Finding | Owner | Effort | Deadline |
|---------|-------|--------|----------|
## 90-Day Priority (Low)
| Finding | Owner | Effort | Deadline |
|---------|-------|--------|----------|
## Verification
We recommend scheduling a free re-test of all Critical and High findings after remediation.
Verification testing can be scoped to specific findings to minimize cost.
---
# 7. Appendices
## Appendix A: Authorized Scope
[Contents of scope.txt — targets tested]
## Appendix B: Evidence Manifest
| Finding | Evidence Path | Type |
|---------|--------------|------|
[list all evidence files referenced]
## Appendix C: Tool Versions
[nmap version, nuclei version, etc.]
## Appendix D: Raw Command Output
[Reference to evidence/ directories containing raw tool output]
---
*This report was produced for [CLIENT] under engagement [ENGAGEMENT_ID].
Distribution is restricted to authorized recipients only.
Do not distribute without written authorization.*
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 286 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 047efae0fcff
report-writer is an agent published in the GitHub repository mukul975/Threatswarm (78 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 71 tokens to every session and 2,307 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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