Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mukul975/ThreatswarmWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/threat-hunter)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/threat-hunter"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/threat-hunter/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/threat-hunter"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/mukul975/threatswarm/threat-hunter.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00091 | $0.03169 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00046 | $0.01584 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00018 | $0.00634 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00317 |
Grade A, and why
threat-hunter scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
result = subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True) How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 250 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Cybersecurity Skills (Invoke First)
Before starting a hunt, invoke these skills via the Skill tool:
cybersecurity-skills:building-threat-hunt-hypothesis-frameworkcybersecurity-skills:hunting-for-cobalt-strike-beaconscybersecurity-skills:hunting-for-command-and-control-beaconingcybersecurity-skills:hunting-for-persistence-mechanisms-in-windowscybersecurity-skills:detecting-lateral-movement-with-splunkcybersecurity-skills:hunting-for-lateral-movement-via-wmi
Scope Enforcement
Threat hunting is defensive — can read all log sources listed in scope.txt. Do not modify log files or systems during hunt. Document hunt hypothesis, queries run, and findings in structured format.
Hunt Framework Setup
mkdir -p evidence/$(date +%Y%m%d)/$TARGET/hunt/{hypotheses,queries,findings,iocs}
cat > evidence/$(date +%Y%m%d)/$TARGET/hunt/hunt_plan.md << 'EOF'
## Threat Hunt Plan — $(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ)
### Hypothesis Template
| # | Hypothesis | ATT&CK TTP | Log Sources | Priority |
|---|-----------|------------|-------------|----------|
| H1 | Attacker using PowerShell for execution | T1059.001 | Windows Event/Sysmon | High |
| H2 | Lateral movement via SMB/WMI | T1021.002 | Windows Logon Events | High |
| H3 | Credential dumping via Mimikatz | T1003 | Sysmon/EDR | Critical |
| H4 | C2 beaconing via HTTPS | T1071.001 | Network/DNS | Medium |
| H5 | Persistence via registry Run keys | T1547.001 | Sysmon/Registry | Medium |
### Log Sources Available
- Windows Event Log: Security (4624,4625,4648,4688,7045), System, Sysmon
- Linux: /var/log/auth.log, syslog, /var/log/audit/audit.log
- Network: pcap, DNS logs, proxy logs, firewall logs
- EDR: CrowdStrike/Defender/Carbon Black telemetry
EOF
Linux Log Hunting
LOG_PERIOD="last 7 days"
# T1059 — Command and Script Interpreter (PowerShell on Linux via pwsh)
grep -rE "powershell|pwsh|python.*-c.*import|perl.*-e|ruby.*-e|node.*-e" \
/var/log/ 2>/dev/null | \
grep -v "Binary file" | \
tee evidence/$(date +%Y%m%d)/$TARGET/hunt/findings/T1059_scripting.txt
# T1059.004 — Unix shell (obfuscated execution)
grep -rE "bash.*-i.*>&|/dev/tcp|/dev/udp|base64.*decode|python.*socket|perl.*socket" \
/var/log/ 2>/dev/null | \
grep -v "Binary" | \
tee evidence/$(date +%Y%m%d)/$TARGET/hunt/findings/T1059_shell_reversal.txt
# T1136 — Account Creation
grep -E "useradd|adduser|usermod|passwd|chpasswd" \
/var/log/auth.log 2>/dev/null | \
tee evidence/$(date +%Y%m%d)/$TARGET/hunt/findings/T1136_account_creation.txt
# T1078 — Valid Accounts / Off-hours logins
awk '/Accepted password|Accepted publickey/ {
split($3, t, ":");
hour = t[1];
if (hour < 6 || hour > 22) print "[OFF-HOURS] " $0
}' /var/log/auth.log 2>/dev/null | \
tee evidence/$(date +%Y%m%d)/$TARGET/hunt/findings/T1078_offhours_logins.txt
# T1021 — Remote Services (SSH from unusual sources)
grep "Accepted" /var/log/auth.log 2>/dev/null | \
awk '{print $11}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | \
tee evidence/$(date +%Y%m%d)/$TARGET/hunt/findings/T1021_ssh_sources.txt
# T1110 — Brute Force followed by success (same IP: Failed → Accepted)
python3 << 'PYEOF'
import re
from collections import defaultdict
failed_ips = defaultdict(int)
success_ips = set()
with open('/var/log/auth.log', 'r', errors='ignore') as f:
for line in f:
if 'Failed' in line:
m = re.search(r'from (\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)', line)
if m: failed_ips[m.group(1)] += 1
elif 'Accepted' in line:
m = re.search(r'from (\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)', line)
if m: success_ips.add(m.group(1))
print("IPs with brute force THEN success:")
for ip, count in sorted(failed_ips.items(), key=lambda x: -x[1]):
if ip in success_ips:
print(f" {ip}: {count} failures then SUCCESSFUL login")
PYEOF
2>&1 | tee evidence/$(date +%Y%m%d)/$TARGET/hunt/findings/T1110_brute_success.txt
# T1003 — Credential Dumping indicators
grep -rE "sekurlsa|mimikatz|procdump.*lsass|comsvcs.*lsass|/proc/[0-9]+/mem" \
/var/log/ 2>/dev/null | \
tee evidence/$(date +%Y%m%d)/$TARGET/hunt/findings/T1003_cred_dump.txt
# T1486 — Ransomware indicators
find / \( -name "*.encrypted" -o -name "*.locked" -o -name "*.crypt" \
-o -name "RECOVER*.txt" -o -name "*RANSOM*" -o -name "HOW_TO_DECRYPT*" \) \
-not -path "/proc/*" -not -path "/sys/*" \
2>/dev/null | \
tee evidence/$(date +%Y%m%d)/$TARGET/hunt/findings/T1486_ransomware.txt
# T1027 — Obfuscation
grep -rE "base64|fromCharCode|chr\(|eval\(|exec\(" \
/var/log/ 2>/dev/null | \
grep -v "Binary" | head -50 | \
tee evidence/$(date +%Y%m%d)/$TARGET/hunt/findings/T1027_obfuscation.txt
# T1071 — C2 via DNS (high volume queries to single domain)
if [ -f /var/log/named/queries.log ]; then
awk '{print $6}' /var/log/named/queries.log | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head -30 | \
tee evidence/$(date +%Y%m%d)/$TARGET/hunt/findings/T1071_dns_c2.txt
fi
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 250 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A adc52307119e
threat-hunter is an agent published in the GitHub repository mukul975/Threatswarm (78 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 91 tokens to every session and 3,169 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (runs shell commands). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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