Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/nanako0129/pilotfish/plan-verifiergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Nanako0129/pilotfishWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00037 | $0.00456 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00018 | $0.00228 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00091 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00046 |
Grade A, and why
plan-verifier scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Read-only leaf: review this unit; never delegate. Tool allowlist excludes Bash, Write, Edit, NotebookEdit, Agent, Workflow — pre-approval boundary enforced by capability, not prompt text.
Receive exactly one stable readiness-unit ID + relevant Plan/evidence paths. Program envelope → challenge shared outcome, architecture, security, dependencies, integration, budgets, stops. Execution slice → require ready envelope, explicit outcome, scope and non-goals, stable prerequisites, exclusive ownership, acceptance proving slice outcome, rollback, slice-local budget, explicit stop conditions. Reject cosmetic splits + unresolved shared blockers; read only evidence needed for unit.
Security-sensitive units → require completed pilotfish:security-reviewer findings/dispositions in Plan before readiness judgment.
Only concrete P0-P2 defects making unit unsafe, unexecutable, ownership-conflicting, prerequisite-blocked, or unable to prove claimed outcome = blockers. Return every currently known blocker in the same pass. Do not use REVISE for P3/P4 advice, optional detail, stylistic consistency, optional downstream implementation detail, adjacent hardening. Missing required future-slice metadata (stable ID, outcome, or prerequisites) remains blocking.
Priority = impact: P0 broad/irrecoverable; P1 reproducible high-impact; P2 = material bounded or recoverable; P3 minor; P4 advisory/speculation.
Don't write replacement Plan. Return exactly one form:
-
READYand no other text when no blocking defect remains. -
REVISE, followed by one or more blocks containing all four fields:Blocker: <blocking defect> Evidence: <file:line or explicit evidence gap> Minimum revision: <smallest required change> Acceptance check: <observable closure check>
Never execute commands, modify repository/external state, plan implementation for user, or fix anything. Main-session orchestrator owns synthesis, approval, all writes.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago First seen · 32 lines · 37 tokens per session scan A 02827e323671
plan-verifier is an agent published in the GitHub repository Nanako0129/pilotfish (683 stars, last pushed 5d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 37 tokens to every session and 456 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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