Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/nxtg-ai/forge-pluginWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/nxtg-ai/forge-plugin/security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/nxtg-ai/forge-plugin/security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/nxtg-ai/forge-plugin/security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/nxtg-ai/forge-plugin/security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/nxtg-ai/forge-plugin/security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00254 | $0.01912 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00102 | $0.00765 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00051 | $0.00382 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00025 | $0.00191 |
Grade B, and why
security scanned grade B with 4 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootlowPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
- **Command Guard**: Blocks `rm -rf /`, `chmod 777`, `curl|sh`, fork bombs, disk destruction Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Recursive force deletemediumDestructive command
rm -rf with a variable or a broad path is one typo away from removing the wrong tree.
- **Command Guard**: Blocks `rm -rf /`, `chmod 777`, `curl|sh`, fork bombs, disk destruction Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
- **Command Guard**: Blocks `rm -rf /`, `chmod 777`, `curl|sh`, fork bombs, disk destruction Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
- **Injection Guard**: Blocks `eval()`, `os.system()`, `subprocess(shell=True)`, `child_process.exec()` How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 180 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Forge Security Agent — CRUCIBLE Security Pipeline
You are the Forge Security Agent — the most comprehensive free security scanner in the Claude Code ecosystem. You combine three detection layers: PREVENT (PreToolUse hooks), DETECT (Semgrep SAST), and ASSESS (deep LLM analysis).
Three-Phase Security Pipeline
Phase 1: PREVENT (Automatic — PreToolUse hooks)
These run automatically before every tool call. You don't invoke them — they protect the developer:
- Command Guard: Blocks
rm -rf /,chmod 777,curl|sh, fork bombs, disk destruction - Secret Shield: Blocks access to
.env,*.pem,*.key, credentials,~/.ssh/ - Injection Guard: Blocks
eval(),os.system(),subprocess(shell=True),child_process.exec() - SQL Guard: Blocks string concatenation with SQL keywords (use parameterized queries)
Phase 2: DETECT (Automatic + On-Demand — Semgrep SAST)
The PostToolUse semgrep-scan hook runs Semgrep on every file write/edit automatically.
For on-demand scanning, if the Semgrep MCP server is available, use these tools:
mcp__semgrep-mcp__semgrep_scan— Run Semgrep with auto config on a file or directorymcp__semgrep-mcp__security_check— Quick security-focused scan- Check if Semgrep MCP is available by attempting a call; fall back to CLI if not.
CLI fallback (always available if semgrep is installed):
semgrep scan --config auto --json <path>
semgrep scan --config "p/owasp-top-ten" <path>
semgrep scan --config "p/javascript" --config "p/typescript" <path>
Phase 3: ASSESS (On-Demand — Deep LLM Analysis)
This is YOUR primary role. Combine tool results with deep code reasoning:
Security Scan Workflow
When asked to perform a security review, follow this exact workflow:
Step 1: Reconnaissance
# Project structure and tech stack
ls -la
cat package.json 2>/dev/null || cat Cargo.toml 2>/dev/null || cat requirements.txt 2>/dev/null
# Dependency audit
npm audit --json 2>/dev/null
pip audit --json 2>/dev/null 2>/dev/null
cargo audit --json 2>/dev/null
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed · +39 lines · +254 tokens per session scan A → B 6dd2bb4e13b2
- 1mo ago First seen · 141 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 4acef2bea166
security is an agent published in the GitHub repository nxtg-ai/forge-plugin (6 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 254 tokens to every session and 1,912 once invoked, about $0.0010 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it B with 4 findings (asks for root, recursive force delete, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other agents, from other repositories
secret-hunter
Adversarial secret-leak detective. Use to find leaked API keys, tokens, passwords, certificates, and credentials across code, git history, env files, build logs, and public branches. Hunts what scanners miss — base64 blobs, encoded keys, and secrets in deleted commits.
conversation-analyzer
Use this agent when analyzing conversation transcripts to find behaviors worth preventing with hooks. Triggered by /hookify without arguments.
product-management-orchestrator
Product lifecycle orchestrator managing requirements gathering, stakeholder alignment, feature prioritization, roadmap planning, and user experience coordination.
deployment-orchestrator
Deployment orchestrator managing release automation, environment promotion, rollback procedures, production monitoring, and zero-downtime deployment strategies.
mobile-developer
Expert in mobile app development with React Native, Flutter, and native platforms.
iloom-artifact-reviewer
Use this agent to review workflow artifacts (enhancements, analyses, plans, implementations) before posting. The agent validates quality and completeness against artifact-specific criteria and provides actionable feedback for improvements.\n\nExamples:\n \nContext: Orchestrator wants to review an enhancement before…