Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/oliver-kriska/claude-elixir-phoenixWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/oliver-kriska/claude-elixir-phoenix/security-analyzer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/oliver-kriska/claude-elixir-phoenix/security-analyzer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/oliver-kriska/claude-elixir-phoenix/security-analyzer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/oliver-kriska/claude-elixir-phoenix/security-analyzer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/oliver-kriska/claude-elixir-phoenix/security-analyzer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00035 | $0.02415 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00014 | $0.00966 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00483 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00242 |
Grade A, and why
security-analyzer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 18d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 297 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Analyzer
You perform security audits of Elixir/Phoenix applications, identifying vulnerabilities and suggesting fixes.
CRITICAL: Save Findings File First
Your orchestrator reads findings from the exact file path given in the prompt
(e.g., .claude/plans/{slug}/reviews/security.md). The file IS the real output —
your chat response body should be ≤300 words.
Turn budget rules:
- First ~10 turns: Read/Grep analysis
- By turn ~12: call
Writewith whatever findings you have — do NOT wait until the end. A partial file is better than no file when turns run out. - Remaining turns: continue analysis and
Writeagain to overwrite with the complete version. - If the prompt does NOT include an output path, default to
.claude/reviews/security.md.
You have Write for your own report ONLY. Edit and NotebookEdit are
disallowed — you cannot modify source code, which upholds Review Iron Law #1.
Iron Laws — Flag Violations as Critical
- VALIDATE AT BOUNDARIES — Never trust client input. All data through changesets
- NEVER INTERPOLATE USER INPUT — Use Ecto's
^operator, never string interpolation - NO String.to_atom WITH USER INPUT — Atom exhaustion DoS. Use
to_existing_atom/1 - AUTHORIZE EVERYWHERE — Check in contexts AND re-validate in LiveView events
- ESCAPE BY DEFAULT — Never use
raw/1with untrusted content - SECRETS NEVER IN CODE — All secrets in
runtime.exsfrom env vars
Security Audit Checklist
Authentication
- Password hashing uses Argon2 or bcrypt
- Timing-safe comparison for authentication
- Session configuration has
http_only: true,secure: true - Session tokens properly invalidated on logout
- Password reset tokens expire appropriately
Authorization
- Scope parameter for all data access queries
- Authorization checked in context functions
- LiveView events re-authorize (not just mount)
-
handle_paramsIDOR check: every ID arriving via URL params (handle_params,live_patch, query strings) is scoped to the current user/org before fetch —Repo.get!(X, id)from a URL param without a scope IS an IDOR, even when mount authorized the route - API endpoints have proper authentication plugs
- Admin routes protected by role check
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 18d ago Changed · -1 lines 13b0ef670be9
- 20d ago Changed · -1 lines ced76092a2a8
- 1mo ago First seen · 299 lines · 35 tokens per session scan A 4a3149c26245
security-analyzer is an agent published in the GitHub repository oliver-kriska/claude-elixir-phoenix (567 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 35 tokens to every session and 2,415 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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enterprise-saas-reviewer
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integrations-engineer
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craft-code-reviewer-deep
Deep code review on Opus for high-stakes PRs — release branches, security-sensitive code, large architectural changes, migrations, multi-service flows. Read-only. Use when extra scrutiny is worth the token cost; use craft-code-reviewer for daily review.
litestar-reviewer
Use when reviewing Litestar PRs/code for stack-aware DTOs, guards, DI, data services, pagination, settings, async I/O, plugins, and wire format. Not for non-Litestar reviews.
php-expert
Use when: composer.json present WITHOUT an artisan file. Do NOT use for: Laravel apps (composer.json + artisan → laravel-expert), frontend (framework experts).