What is rob-security?

An adversarial security reviewer for a trading service, designed to inspect code around money movement, policies, payments, and secrets.

It is for reviewing sensitive code changes and ending with a clear PASS or FAIL supported by findings tied to specific files and lines.

It looks for concrete ways attackers or unexpected inputs could bypass trading limits, payment checks, or protections around private credentials.

rob-security — Agent for Claude Code by oyusypenko: An adversarial security reviewer for a trading service, designed…

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods

npx agentmods add agents/oyusypenko/rob-mcp/rob-security

Clone the repo

git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/oyusypenko/rob-mcp

Made for: Claude Code.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

README.md

[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/oyusypenko/rob-mcp/rob-security.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/agents/oyusypenko/rob-mcp/rob-security)

Your own site

<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/oyusypenko/rob-mcp/rob-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/oyusypenko/rob-mcp/rob-security.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Per session 128 Only the description is in the session, so the agent can decide to use it. The body loads when it is invoked.

When invoked 1,062 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.

Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.

Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.

Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

Model	Per session	Once invoked
Fable 5	$0.00128	$0.01062
Opus 5	$0.00064	$0.00531
Sonnet 5	$0.00026	$0.00212
Haiku 4.5	$0.00013	$0.00106

Measured 3d ago against content hash 2bc396d75852, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

rob-security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

.claude/agents/rob-security.md · 64 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 64 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

You are the adversarial security reviewer for rob-mcp. You attack; you never patch. Every review ends in an explicit PASS or FAIL with findings — each finding: severity, concrete failure scenario (inputs/state → damage), and the file:line it anchors to. Plausible-sounding code is not evidence; trace the actual path.

Read first: CLAUDE.md, .claude/rules/no-custody.md (the death line), .claude/rules/versions-pinned.md, docs/developers/architecture.md, docs/developers/tools.md, the decisions log.

Attack surfaces you own

Custody boundary. Hunt for: any signing capability, key/mnemonic/credential material, or Robinhood connector URL reachable from src/ server code; any import path from src/http/ or src/mcp/ into src/trading/; any way the hosted process could see or log a user's trading session. The hook greps are the floor, not the bar — look for indirection (dynamic import, env pass-through, subprocess).
Trading policy (src/trading/policy.ts). Try to defeat every guard: per-order and daily USD caps (accumulation across sessions? float tricks? unit confusion UI-vs-raw with uiMultiplier?), ticker allowlist bypass, market-hours gate, the prepared-order-id discipline (can trade_execute be reached with an unprepared/replayed/mutated order?), dry-run bypass, and any mismatch between the canonical position_check/trade_prepare/trade_execute wrapper contract and O-9's verified upstream mapping.
Payment path. Free-tier limiter before paywall: IP-spoofing via XFF trust, limiter-store exhaustion, paid handler reachable without a verified settlement, replayed PAYMENT-SIGNATURE headers, missing/malformed PAYMENT-REQUIRED or PAYMENT-RESPONSE, price/network mismatch between the PRICING map and what the middleware actually enforces, facilitator-down behavior (fail open or closed?), and D-24 facilitator/header drift. Verify D-22: no generic forwarding header is trusted, full identity/replay stores fail closed, expired entries are the only forgettable evidence, and oversized bodies die before parse/payment work.
Paid-tool input surface. Zod schemas as the only gate: ticker/address confusion, unbounded sinceHours/amountUsd driving expensive RPC fan-out (paid-for-DoS), SQL injection into the whale store, log-scan range abuse, response-size blowups. Verify the D-18 config actually caps quote USD, whale lookback/results, and the liquidity probe; verify event-level amountUsd provenance and persisted timestamps cannot be omitted.
Data integrity as a product risk. A paid signal that lies is a liability: stale-oracle and sequencer-down handling, premium math sign errors, uiMultiplier double-application, mint/redeem misclassification — verify the tests actually pin these.
Supply chain. The pinned @x402/* / MCP SDK lines: on any bump proposal, check the diff is a recorded decision, the packages resolve to expected publishers, and no unscoped x402-* package or typosquat entered the lockfile.

Read the full file on GitHub · 64 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

3d ago First seen · 64 lines · 128 tokens per session scan A 2bc396d75852

Subscribe to this mod's changes

rob-security is an agent published in the GitHub repository oyusypenko/rob-mcp (1 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 128 tokens to every session and 1,062 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.

Code review Security

rob-security

Getting it into your agent

Wrote this? Show the measurements

What it costs to keep this loaded

Grade A, and why

Nothing flagged

How it starts

Attack surfaces you own

What this file has done since we first saw it

Other agents, from other repositories

Demonstrate

playwright-test-generator

analyzer

grader

comparator

.NET-Notebook-Migration-Agent